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Fourth Amendment and Statutory
Limitations on Entry and Inspection
of Commercial Property in
Environmental Enforcement
Steven G. Davison *

In the twelve years since Earth Day in 1970, public attention
has been focused upon the effects of pollution on the health and
well-being of people and on the protection of the world's ecosystems. In response to this public concern, the United States Congress has enacted environmental protection statutes that attempt
to strike a reasonable balance between economic growth and protection of the public health and the environment.
Federal legislation has been enacted to protect the public and
the environment from nuclear radiation,' air pollutants. 2 water
pollutants,3 toxic chemicals,4 hazardous and solid wastes,S noise,b
and natural resources development. 7 Congress also has enacted
statutes to protect endangered species of fish and wildlife. 8 Many
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.S., 1968. Comdl
University; J.D., 1971, Yale University.
1. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976 & Supp. v
1981); Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act of 1978. 42 U.S.c. § 7901 (SUpp. V 1981).
2. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. V 1981).
3. E.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.c. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.c. §§ 300f-300j-IO. 7401-7626 (1976
& Supp. V 1981); Marine Protection. Research. and Sanctuaries Act. 33 U.S.c.
§§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
4. Toxic Substances Control Act. IS U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. V 1981);
Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, 7 U.S.c. § 13b-136y (Supp. 1982).
5. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 42 U.S.c. §§ 6901-6986 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation, and Llabtlity Act of 1980, 42 U.S.c. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V 1981) ("Superfund Act").
6. Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.c. §§ 4901-4918 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
7. E.g.. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. 30 U.S.C. §§ 12011328 (Supp. V 1981); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.c. §§ 1331-1356
(1976 & Supp. V 1981); Coastal Zone Management Act. 16 U.S.c. §§ 1451-1404
(Supp. 1982).
8. E.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.c. §§ 1531-1543 (Supp. 1982). Manne
Mammal Protection Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (Supp. 1982).

75

76

JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 3:75

of these federal statutes establish or authorize pollution control
and environmental protection standards that regulate the operation of industrial and commercial facilities. 9
Effective enforcement of pollution control and environmental
protection standards established by these federal statutes and the
regulations promulgated thereunder requires periodic, unannounced inspections of regulated premises by federal, state, or local government officials. On-site inspection of pollution control
equipment and operating procedures often is necessary in order to
determine whether a regulated business is complying with pollutant discharge and emission limitations and standards, and other
statutory and regulatory environmental protection standards.
During such inspections, violations of regulatory standards may
be discovered, resulting in imposition of civil or criminal penalties
of fines, imprisonment, or injunctive relief. If such inspections are
unannounced, frequent, and rigorous in scope, violations of statutory and regulatory environmental protection standards are likely
to be detected by government inspectors. If such violations usually are detected, and if the cost of compliance with these standards is less than the amount of monetary penalties imposed by
courts or administrative agencies for such violations,IO businesses
will comply to the extent that it is technologically feasible to do
so. 11 Consequently, effective inspection schemes are crucial to the
successful implementation and enforcement of federal environmental protection statutes.
This article will examine the limitations that the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution places upon entries and
inspections of commercial property by government agents for purposes of enforcing federal environmental protection statutes. The
inspection provisions of most federal environmental protection
statutes will be analyzed to determine if they comply with the requirements of the fourth amendment.
FOURTH AMENDMENT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution pro9. Although private residential dwelling units may in some instances be subject to
regulation under federal environmental protection statutes, these statutes primarily
regulate businesses operating on commercial property. Consequently, this article will
focus only upon businesses operating on commercial property that are regulated
under these federal environmental protection statutes.
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (Supp. V 1981).
11. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 669 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1982).
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hibits any search or seizure that is unreasonable. 12 "[T]he Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches applies
to administrative inspections of private commercial property."13
Consequently, the fourth amendment protects owners of commercial property against unreasonable searches and seizures by government agents seeking to enforce federal environmental
protection statutes.
Although the fourth amendment does not explicitly state that a
search or seizure must be authorized by a warrant, the Supreme
Court of the United States requires a warrant unless the search or
seizure in question fits within a recognized exception to the general rule. 14 A search or seizure is permitted without a warrant
when there is a valid consent,15 when there are exigent circum12. Go-Bart Importing v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). The fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses. papers. and effects.
against unreasonable searches and seizures. shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation. and partICUlarly describing the place to be searched. and the persons or things to be setz.ed.
U.S. CON ST. amend. IV.
13. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981). Fourth amendment protecuons
are not limited to one's dwelling place. See v. City of Seattle. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
14. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
The judicial warrant has a significant role to play in that It provides the detached
scrutiny of a neutral magistrate. which is a more reliable safeguard against unproper
searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer 'engaged m the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crune.' ... Once a lawful search has
begun. it is also far more likely that it will not exceed proper bounds when It IS done:
pursuant to a judicial authorization 'panicularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.' Further. a warrant assures the mdivldual
whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the execuung officer.
his need to search. and the limits of his power to search . . . .
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I. 9 (1977) (citations omitted). See See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (warrant required in order to make unconsented routine.
periodic inspection of private commercIal property to obtain compliance WIth
municipal fire code); Marshall v. Barlow's. Inc.• 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (warrant required in order to make unconsented administrative inspection of private commercial
property under Occupational Safety and Health Act. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976), to
inspect for safety hazards and violations of regulations promulgated under the Act);
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States. 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
15. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent must be freely
and voluntarily given in order for search pursuant to consent to be excepted from
fourth amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements); Bumper v. North
Carolina. 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (consent is not valid when it is given in acqUiescence to
a claim oflawful authority); United States v. Matlock. 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (a person
who does not own property may give consent to search property that is valid against
another person if the person giving the consent mutually uses, possesses common authority over, or has other sufficient relationshIp to the premises or effects sought to be
inspected, so that it is reasonable to recognize that he has the right to permll the
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stances present,16 or when the governmental interests that are furthered by permitting government officials to make warrantless
searches or seizures in the situations in question outweigh the invasions of privacy resulting from such warrantless conduct. 17
Furthermore, probable cause is not always required in order for a
search or seizure to be reasonable. IS
ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS AS SEARCHES OR SEIZURES

In order for an inspection or surveillance by a government
agent pursuant to an environmental protection statute to be a
"search" or "seizure" triggering fourth amendment protection, the
governmental conduct must be found to have violated a person's
actual expectation of privacy, and this expectation must be one
that society recognizes as justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate. 19
inspection in his own right and that the other person has assumed the risk that he
might permit the property to be searched).
16. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948». Exigent circumstances may be present
when evidence of a crime may disappear, or the environment harmed, if police or
governmental officials are required to delay a search or seizure until a warrant is
obtained. See infra text accompanying notes 182-99.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (warrant not
required for fixed immigration checkpoint); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976) (warrant not required for inventory of car impounded by police for parking
violations); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (warrant not required for mine
inspection).
18. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976). q: Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
A defendant in a criminal trial has standing to challenge the admissibility of information or evidence, on the grounds that it was obtained as a result of an illegal search
or seizure, if the illegal search or seizure violated his own personal fourth amendment
rights; however, a person cannot have suppressed as evidence at a criminal trial items
or information that were obtained in violation a third person's constitutional rights.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (a passenger in an automobile that he does not
own generally does not have standing under the fourth amendment to challenge a
search of that automobile and the seizure of items that he does not own); United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (defendant in a criminal trial does not have
standing under the fourth amendment to challenge the admissibility of evidence
taken from a third person through an intentional violation of that third person's
fourth amendment rights).
Evidence obtained either directly or indirectly in violation of a person's fourth
amendment rights will not be admissible as evidence at that person's criminal trial
under the "exclusionary rule," see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975);
however, such evidence may be admissible as evidence against that person in a civil
proceeding seeking to impose a civil penalty upon that person or to obtain injunctive
relief against that person. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
19. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (use of pen register device-which
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Certain types of governmental inspection or surveillance of
commercial property pursuant to the enforcement of federal environmental protection statutes clearly constitute a "search" or
"seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Entry of
plants and offices on commercial premises by government officials
and inspection of equipment and business records on the premises
are government actions that constitute a fourth amendment search
or seizure if the areas and items inspected were not open to entry
or view by the public. 20 Pursuant to this principle, EPA's aerial
photography of various parts of a 2000-acre industrial facility was
held to violate actual and reasonable expectations of privacy protected under the fourth amendment, where some of the photographs could be enlarged to make observable items located in
interior regions of the facility which were impossible to observe
from anywhere but directly above. 21
Some types of surveillance and inspection activities by government agents do not constitute fourth amendment searches or
seizures. Pollutants that have been discharged into a public waterway have been held to have been "abandoned to public exposure" and therefore not protected under the fourth amendment, so
that when government agents take a sample containing these pollutants from the public waterway, no fourth amendment search or
seizure occurS. 22 The same result would probably be reached with
respect to governmental seizure of pollutant emissions from a
sample of ambient air. Even if the polluter has an actual expectation of privacy against governmental seizure of pollutants he has
records numbers dialed by a telephone, but does not intercept the contents of a telephone conversation-held not to be a fourth amendment "search"). Set' Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (interception of contents of one person's conversation on a telephone, by attaching an electronic listening deVice to the outside of a
public telephone booth, held to be a fourth amendment "search").
Some courts have held that the "essence" of this actual (subJecuve) expectal10n of
privacy requirement is "that the pany 'must have acted in such a way that it would
have been reasonable for him to expect that he would not be observed: " Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1364 (E.O. Mich. 1982) (quotmg Unlled
States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1980)), thus mterpreting "thIS ll!>pect of
the test as an 'objective' rather than a 'subjective' requirement." Do ... Chemical, 536
F. Supp. at 1364.
20. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967); Air Pollul1on Vanance Bd. v.
Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
21. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.O. Mich. 191.(2)
22. United States v. Syncon Resins, Inc., 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1305 (O.NJ.
May 29, 1981). This holding is consistent with the holdings of a maJonl), of couru
that trash or garbage that has been placed on the curb of a publlc street IS not protected by the fourth amendmenL See United States v. Shelby. 573 F.2d 971 (7th Clr.
1978).
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discharged or emitted, this expectation of privacy would not be
recognized as justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate. But a different
result may occur if government agents are trespassing on private
commercial property when they take pollutant samples or conduct
observations or inspections.
In Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp. ,23 the
Supreme Court held that a fourth amendment search did not occur when, without the property owner's knowledge or consent, a
state air pollution inspector entered the outdoor yard of private
commercial property and made a Ringelmann opacity test 24 of
plumes of smoke being emitted from stacks on the premises. The
Supreme Court based this holding on the "open field" doctrine of
Hester v. United States,25 in which the Court held that no fourth
amendment search occurred when federal agents trespassed onto
open fields on private property and observed criminal conduct.
The Court in Western Alfalfa Corp. found that the state air pollution inspector in question had made his observations from an area
equivalent to an open field, since he was not on premises from
which the public was excluded. 26 In addition, the Court observed
that the inspector had not entered the plant or offices on the property, and had not inspected stacks or any other equipment,27 files
or papers, thereby suggesting that without the owner's consent,
such conduct in private plants or offices would be a fourth amendment search or seizure. 28 However, the Supreme Court has not
23. 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
24. A Ringelmann opacity test involves having a trained inspector stand in a position where he has an unobstructed view of a smoke plume, observe the smoke, and
rate the smoke to the opacity scale of the Ringelmann chart. The inspector matches
the color and density of the smoke plume with the numbered example on the chart.
See Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 864 n.1
(1974).
25. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
26. 416 U.S. at 865. The Court also noted that the inspector "had sighted what
anyone in the city who was near the plant could see in the sky-plumes of smoke."

ld
27. 416 U.S. at 864-65.
28. Subsequent cases have interpreted Western Alfalfa Corp. as permitting government agents, without a warrant, to trespass onto private property to obtain information so long as there is no search or inspection of buildings or the curtilage of
buildings (the area immediately surrounding a building that is equivalent to a courtyard). See United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Basille, 569 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1978).
In dictum in Western Alfalfa, the Supreme Court indicated that a fourth nmendment search would not occur if an inspector, acting under the Noise Control Act of
1972,42 U.S.c. §§ 4901-4918 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), enters a "railroad right-of-way
to determine whether noise standards are being violated." 416 U.S. at 865.
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decided whether a fourth amendment search or seizure occurs
when government agents trespass onto open areas of private commercial property and take samples of waste water or ambient air
for purposes of testing for pollutant concentrations. 29 In light of
the decision in Western Alfalfa Corp., whether such conduct constitutes a fourth amendment search or seizure probably will depend upon whether the area from which the sample was obtained
was open to the public (i.e .. an open field or yard. as opposed to
an area totally fenced in or closely guarded) and was observable
from adjacent public or private property.30
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT INSPECTIONS
PURSUANT TO WARRANTS

Search warrants authorizing administrative inspections pursuant to enforcement investigations must be based upon probable
causeY However, probable cause in this context differs from the
probable cause required in the context of criminal
investigations. 32
29. Western Alfalfa Corp.. as noted earlier in text accompanying note 27 supra.
appears to hold that a fourth amendment "search" or "seIZure" would occur If government agents trespassed into a building on private commercial propeny and took a
wastewater sample or stack gas sample in the building.
30. See supra note 26 and text accompanying note 20. Applymg Western Alfalfa
Corp., in United States v. Syncon Resins. Inc .• 16 En,··t Rep. Ca!>. (BNA) 1305
(D.N.l. May 29, 1981), the coun held that Coast Guard officers did not conduct a
fourth amendment "search" or "seizure" when they trespassed onto pnvate commercial propeny (to investigate quantities of oil running into a nver) and took three Wa!>tewater samples from a riverbank above the mean high water mark. from under a
product storage tank inside a containment dike. and from a leachmg pond In an open
area. The coun noted that although the private commerCial propeny 15 !>urrounded
on three of its four sides by a fence and access to the propeny IS gamed through an
entrance gate adjacent to which is a guardhouse. the Coast Guard officers entered
upon the propeny when the gate was open and no guard wa!> m attendance The
coun also noted that the officers did not enter any bUlldmg; that the ollicer!> had
entered the propeny after the oil discharge had been observed by other Coast Guard
officers from an adjacent piece of pnvate propeny: and that the oJ! discharge could
have been seen by anyone traveling along the river. The coun also observed that the
defendants had a very limited expectation of pnvacy. because the) were !>ubJect to
regulation under 33 U.S.c. § 1321 to prevent spills of oil; the coun a!>Sened that
"closely regulated businesses have little or no reasonable expectation or (.rh') pnvac)'
when officials conduct a search which relates to the rea!>on the corporation I!> regulated." 16 Env't Rep. Cas .• at 1308-09 n.6. See I'!fra text accompanymg notes 31-1!.< I
See also United States v. Oliver. 657 F.2d 85 (6th Clr. 1981). Dow Chemll:al Co ".
United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
31. Camara v. Municipal Coun, 387 U.S. 523.534-39 (1967)
32. In the criminal context. probable cause means that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the items to be seIZed have a nexus to cnmmal activit)' (I.e.
are instrumentalities. fruits or evidence of cnme. or contraband). Warden \ Hayden.
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Probable cause in the criminal law sense is not required. For purposes of an administrative search . . . , probable cause justifYing
the issuance of a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence
of an existing violation, but also on a showing that 'reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an. . . inspection
are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].33

For example, probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for
fire, health, or building code inspections by local officials can be
established by "the passage of time, the nature of the building
(e.g., a multi-unit family apartment house), or the condition of the
entire area, but . . . will not necessarily depend upon specific
knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling."34 When
this administrative inspection probable cause standard is satisfied,
a court may issue a search warrant authorizing administrative inspections for code enforcement PJlrposes of all of the buildings in
a particular neighborhood or area, rather than issue an individual
search warrant for each building. 35 By analogy, probable cause
387 U.S. 294 (1967), and will be found on the premises to be searched. Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
33. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978) (footnote omitted) (quoting from Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967».
This definition of probable cause for the issuance of warrants for administrative
inspections is based upon the concept that there is not a single definition of probable
cause that governs all searches and seizures; instead, " 'probable cause' is the standard
by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of
reasonableness." Camara, 387 U.S. at 534. Application of this standard involves
weighing the governmental interest being furthered by a particular inspection program against the invasion of privacy caused by that program and against the effect
that application of the criminal law probable cause standard would have upon the
enforcement of regulatory health and safety codes and statutes. Camara, 387 U.S. at
534-38.
In Barlow's and Camara, the Supreme Court did not differentiate between administrative inspections resulting in civil penalties or sanctions as opposed to administrative inspections resulting in criminal penalties of fines or imprisonment. The
Supreme Court in Barlow's, however, did differentiate between administrative enforcement inspections, to which its decision applied, and criminal law searches. 436
U.S. at 320-21. The Court indicated that the traditional criminal law probable cause
standard, see supra note 32, would apply when criminal charges and sanctions arc
contemplated for a person being subjected to an administrative search. See Donovan
v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 598 n.6 (warrant required to enter commercial property to
search for contraband or evidence of crime); Note, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Administrative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment, 9 ENVTL. L. 149, 165-66 (1978). The
Supreme Court, however, has not indicated whether the criminal law probable cause
standard would apply to determine the validity of a warrant authorizing an administrative enforcement inspection that results in a subsequent criminal prosecution when
criminal law violations were not suspected prior to the inspection.
34. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538.
35. Id. at 537-38. The reasons given in support of permitting issuance of areawide search warrants authorizing inspections of all structures for purposes of enforce-
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for issuance of a search warrant authorizing an administrative enforcement inspection under an environmental protection statute,
such as the Clean Air Act,36 might be established by an administrative plan that scheduled periodic inspections of regulated industries on the basis of the frequency with which the type of
pollution control equipment to be inspected breaks down or malfunctions, or on the basis of the toxicity of the pollutants or wastes
emitted, discharged, or handled in the industry.3 7 The issuance of
warrants based on such factors, rather than on the particular conditions of each individual site, would foster routine periodic inspections of all businesses in a particular industrial category or
subcategory that is regulated by the statute, rather than infrequent
spotchecks of just some of these businesses. The goals of federal
environmental protection statutes would be better served by a
thorough plan of industry-wide inspection; enforcement should
not be limited to situations in which there is prior knowledge of
violations of applicable environmental protection and pollution
control standards. 38
WARRANTLESS ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS OF COMMERCIAL
PROPERTY UNDER THE "PERVASIVELY REGULATED
INDUSTRY" EXCEPTION

One exception to the general rule requiring a search warrant for
unconsented administrative enforcement inspections of non-public areas of private commercial property39 is the "pervasively regulated industry" exception, as recently interpreted by the United
ment of municipal fire, safety, and health codes are that routine penooll: inspection of
all structures is "the only effective way to seek Universal comphance With the minimum standards required by municipal codes .. ,," Id at 535. and that the "deCISion to
conduct an area inspection is unavoidably based on ... appraisal of condlllons In the
area as a whole, not on ... knowledge of conditions In each pamcular bUilding." Id
at 536.
A search warrant authorizmg an administrative inspection. however. mu!>t be
drafted to apprise the owner of premises being Inspected of the reason for the inspection and the place or objects that the officers are entitled to take or inspect. ThIS
circumscribes the discretion of the officers executing the search warrant and Informs
the owner of the lawful limits of the inspectors' power to search. Commonwealth v.
Lipomi, 385 Mass. 370. 432 N.E.2d 86. 89-90 (1982).
36. 42 U.S.c. § 7414 (Supp. V 1981).
37. C.f. Public Service Co. v. EPA. 509 F. Supp. 720 (S D. Ind t98t) (Warrant for
inspection of commercial premises under Clean Air Act Issued on the basIS of suspected violations of state implementation plan emission standards and overall purposes of Clean Air Act).
38. See supra note 35.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 23-30.
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States Supreme Court in .Donovan v. .Dewey.40 In .Donovan, the
Supreme Court held that provisions of Section 103(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act4l authorizing warrantless inspections of underground and surface mines42 and providing for
injunctive relief against a mine operator who refused entry to an
inspector seeking to make such a warrantless inspection, do not
violate the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. 43
Noting that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution44 to regulate commercial enterprises by means of inspection programs,4S the .Donovan Court
found that privacy interests in commercial property "may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory schemes
authorizing warrantless inspections."46 In approving the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act provisions, the Court established that
the statute authorized warrantless conduct, and then, building on
that foundation, assessed the pervasiveness of regulation of the
industry, reasonableness of the search, and protection of special
privacy concerns of the industry. In the next section of this article,
40. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
41. 30 U.S.c. § 813(a) (Supp. V 1981).
42. The Act defines "coal or other mine" to include "an area of land from which
minerals are extracted in nonliquid form or. if in liquid form. are extracted with
workers underground." 30 U.S.C. § 802(h) (Supp. V 1981). It was undisputed in
Donovan v. Dewey that appellee's stone quarry was within this definition and subject
to regulation under the Act. 452 U.S. at 596 n.2.
43. Section 103(a) of that Act directs federal mine inspectors to inspect underground mines at least four times a year and surface mines at least twice a year to
determine whether mines are in compliance with health and safety standards promulgated by the Secretary of Interior under the Act to protect mine workers. Section
103(a) also requires that federal mine inspectors make follow-up inspections to determine whether previously discovered violations have been corrected. In addition.
§ 103(a) grants federal mine inspectors "a right of entry to, upon, or through any coal
or other mine without a search warrant" and without providing advance notice of an
inspection to any person. A mine operator who refuses to allow a warrantless inspection conducted pursuant to § 103(a) may be subject to injunctive or other appropriate
relief in a civil action instituted by the Secretary of Labor. 30 U.S.c. § 818(a)( I)(C)
(Supp. V 1981).
Donovan v. Dewey was a civil action brought by the Secretary of Labor against
operators of a stone quarry seeking to enjoin them from refusing to permit warrantless inspections of the quarry pursuant to § 103(a) of the Act. The District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees (stone quarry operators) on the
grounds that § 103(a) of the Act violated the fourth amendment. The Secretary of
Labor appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.c.
§ 1252; the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, 449 U.S. 1122 (198!), and
then reversed the District Court's judgment and remanded to the District Court.
44. U.S. CON ST. art. I. § 8. cl. 3.
45. 452 U.S. at 599.
46. Id.
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these and other considerations relevant to the pervasively regulated industry exception will be explored more fully and applied
to environmental protection statutes.
To an extent, Donovan v. Dewey provides standards by which to
evaluate warrantless administrative inspections in light of fourth
amendment requirements. However, it is important to note that if
a provision of a federal environmental protection statute authorizing warrantless administrative inspections of commercial premises
is held to violate the standards established in DOllol'all I'. Dewey,
the provision is not automatically declared void. It may be cured
by amendment or by the adoption of administrative regulations. 47
In some cases, however, warrantless administrative inspections of
commercial premises may not be permissible in the enforcement
of a particular federal environmental protection statute, regardless
of how the statute or regulations are drafted. 48
1.

Statutory Authorization of Warrantless Inspections

The Court in Donol'an I'. Dewey recognized that administrative
inspections not authorized by statute do not necessari(J' violate the
fourth amendment.49 Warrantless entries and inspections of commercial property may be lawful under exceptions to the general
rule requiring a warrant, such as the emergency exception 50 and
the pervasively regulated industry exception. But in order for
warrantless administrative inspections to be constitutional under
the pervasively regulated industry exception. they must be permissible under the statute in question. 51 In Donol'all I'. Dewey, the
47. Marshall v. Barlow's. Inc.. 436 U.S. 307. 325 n.23 (1978)
48. See infra text accompanying notes 99-108.
49. This conclusion follows from the Court's statement that warrantless Inspections of commercial property may be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment If
not authorized by law. 452 U.S. at 599.
50. See infra text accompanylIlg notes 182-99
51. Commonwealth v. Lipomi. 385 Mass. 370. 432 N.E.2d 86. <)5 (1982). See
BaleIo v. Klutznick, 519 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Cal. 1981) (reaching same result In deCIsion issued after Donol'an ~'. Dewel' was Issued. but which did not cite Donol'an I'.
Dewey): United States v. Pugh. 417 F. Supp. 1019. 1023 (W.O. Mich. 1976) (reaching
same result in decision issued before Donol'an I'. Dewey Wa!o deCided).
The court in United States v. Rucinski. 658 F.2d 741 (10th Clr. \'~81), on the other
hand, interpreted Donol'an 1'. Dewey more broadly. allOWing inspection of commerCial
property without a search warrant when the search u. "reasonable". even In the absence of a regulatory scheme established by statute prOViding for warrantless InSpections. The court in Rucinski held that the furtherance of federal Interest (determining
whether fraud against the United States was being commuted by pe~on5 harvesting
timber from national forests) Justified warrantless lelescoplc obser\'atloru. of employees on defendant's lumber company's pnvate property. (The court In RUCinski alter·
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Supreme Court assumed, without supporting analysis of the Act
or its legislative history, that the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act authorizes warrantless administrative inspections,52 apparently because the Act does not explicitly require a warrant in order to make required inspections under the Act. 53 Consequently,
it is reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court would find that
where federal environmental protection statutes grant federal
agencies a right of entry and inspection of commercial premises
but are silent on the issue of warrant, such statutes implicitly authorize warrantless inspections. Legislative history strongly indicating that such inspections should be made pursuant to a warrant
might cause the Supreme Court to interpret such provisions as requiring entries and inspections to be made pursuant to a warrant.
Many of the federal environmental protection statutes satisfy
f)onovan v. Dewey's requirement that there must be implicit statutory authorization of warrantless entries and inspections of commercial premises. Statutes with this type of provision include the
Clean Air Act,54 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,55 the
natively appears to have held that telescopic observations did not constitute a
"search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 658 F.2d at 746. Set'supra
text accompanying notes 19-30.) See also United States v. Gordon, 655 F.2d 487 (2d
Cir. 1981), discussed infra at note 135.
52. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 596, 597-98 nn.4-5.
53. See United States v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 667 F.2d 510, 516 n.6 (6th Cir.
1981). in which the court noted that "the right of entry set forth in 30 U.S.C.
§ 8l3(b)(l) [under the Coal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1969) ... has consistently
been interpreted as creating an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The legislative history to the 1977 Act specifically states there is no need for a
warrant . . . ." The decision in Donovan v. Dewey interpreted the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-961 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). but the
warrantless inspection procedure of the 1977 Act only differs from the 1969 Act in
that it specifically allows a representative of the mine operator to accompany the federal inspector during an inspection. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 667 F.2d at 517 n.8.
54. 42 U.S.c. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. V 1981). The Clean Air Act contains a provision that grants the Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) or his authorized representative a "right of entry to, upon, or through
any premises"; and a right, at reasonable times, to have access to and copy any
records required to be kept by EPA regulations, to inspect any monitoring equipment
or method required by EPA regulations, and to sample any emissions which arc required to be sampled under the Act, of a pollutant emission source, or any other
person subject to any requirement of the Act, other than manufacturers of new motor
vehicles and new motor vehicle engines subject to regulation under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7525(c) or 7542. 42 U.S.c. § 7414(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981). See Public Service Co. of
Indiana v. EPA, 509 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ind. 1981). The Clean Air Act appears to
authorize such entries and inspections to be made without a warrant, because the
provision authorizing such entries and inspections docs not explicitly require a warrant in order to make such entries and inspections, and the Act's legislative history is
silent with respect to whether administrative inspections under the Act can be made
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without a warrant. This conclusion is further supponed by the fact that the only
procedural requirement that the Act requires EPA to follow prior to making an entry
and inspection is to provide the state air pollution control agenc), reasonable prior
notice of an entry, inspection, or monitoring with respect to any emission standard.
limitation, or other requirement adopted by the state as part of an applicable implementation plan or as part of an order issued under 42 U.S.c. § 7413(d). 42 U.S.C.
§ 7414(d)(I) (Supp. V 1981).
In Bunker Hill Co. Lead & Zinc Smelter v. EPA. 658 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1981).
EPA, however. declined to claim a right to make warrantless inspections under 42
U.S.c. § 7414(a)(2); the court in that case held that the power of entry granted under
42 U.S.c. § 7414(a)(2) was sufficient authority to justify issuance by a coun of ex
pane inspection warrants. See supra Marshall v. Barlow·s. Inc.. 436 U.S. 307. 325
n.23 (1978), and text accompanying notes 4748.
But the coun in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States. 536 F. Supp. 1355. 1362 (E.D.
Mich. 1982), held that the Clean Air Act requires a warrant in order to enter commercial premises to make an inspection under 42 U.S.c. § 7414. and also indicated in
dictum that the Act requires a warrant in order to make a forced entry for purposes of
making an inspection under 42 U.S.C. § 7414. The Dow coun based this conclusion
upon dictum in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). which stated that the
Clean Air Act envisions "reson to federal-coun enforcement when entry is refused:'
id. at 321, because the Act "grants federal district courts jurisdiction 'to require compliance' with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency's attempt to
inspect under 42 U.S.c. § 7414 (1976 ed .. Supp. I). when the Administrator has commenced 'a civil action' for injunctive relief or to recover a penalty. 42 U.S.c.
§ 7413(b)(4) (1976 ed., Supp. I)." Id. at 322 n.18. This dictum. however. should be
interpreted only as indicating that § 114 of the Clean Air Act does not permit forcible
entry by EPA without a warrant when entry to inspect is refused. because this dictum
only referred to what EPA must do when entry is refused when attempted without a
warrant. Marshall I'. Barlow's, Inc. did not address in this dictum whether EPA may
make a warrantless non-forcible entry and inspection of commercial premises under
§ 114 of the Clean Air Act under the pervasively regulated industry exception. or
whether refusal to permit a warrantless entry and mspection by EPA pursuant to
§ 114 could be punished by civil or criminal penalties. Public Service Co. of Indiana
v. EPA. 509 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ind. 1981). a case decided before Donol'an v. Dewey,
stated in dictum that Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. requires EPA to obtain a warrant in
order to make an entry and inspection authorized by the Clean Air Act under 42
U.S.c. § 7414(a).
Several courts have held that private independent contractors hued by EPA. as well
as full-time employees of EPA, are "authorized representatives" of EPA within the
meaning of 42 U.S.c. § 7414. Bunker Hill Co. Lead & Zinc Smelter v. EPA. 658 F.2d
1280 (9th Cir. 1981);ln re Aluminum Co. of America, 15 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1116
(M.D.N.C. 1980), rel"d on other grounds sub nom Aluminum Co. of America v. EPA.
663 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1981), but other courts have held that only full-time employees
of EPA, but not independent private contractors hired by EPA. are "authonzed representatives" of EPA within the meaning of this section. Stauffer Chemical Co. v. EPA.
647 F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co.• 17 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1753 (6th Cir. July 7, 1982). See Comment, EPA's Use of Contractors on
Stationary Source Inspections Provokes Circuit Split Ol'er § I J.I of Clean Air AN. 12
ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10018 (Feb. 1982); Note. EPA EnjOined From Using
Contractors to Inspect Emission Sources 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 247 (1982).
The Clean Air Act states that entries and inspections under 42 U.S.c. § 7414 arc for
purposes of developing or assisting in the development of state implementation plans
under 42 U.S.c. § 7410, new source standards of performance under 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411, or any hazardous pollutant emission standard under 42 U.S.c. § 7412; deter-
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Safe Drinking Water Act,56 the Federal Environmental Pesticide
mining whether any person is in violation of any such standard or any requirement of
a state implementation plan; or carrying out any provision of the Clean Air Act. other
than a provision of subchapter II of the Act governing a manufacturer of new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines. 42 U.s.C. § 7414(a) (Supp. V 1981).
The Clean Air Act also has provisions that appear to provide for warrantless entries
and inspections of the commercial premises of manufacturers of automobiles and automobile engines. 42 U.S.C. § 7525(c) provides that for purposes of enforcement of
certain testing and certification requirements under the Clean Air Act,
officers or employees duly designated by the [EPA] Administrator, upon presenting
appropriate credentials to the manufacturer or person in charge, are authorized
(I) to enter, at reasonable times. any plant or other establishment of such manufacturer, for the purpose of conducting tests of vehicles or engines in the hands of the
manufacturer, or (2) to inspect at reasonable times, records. files, papers, processes.
controls, and facilities used by such manufacturer in conducting tests under regulations of the Administrator. Each such inspection shall be commenced and completed with reasonable promptness.
This section would probably be interpreted as authorizing warrantless entries and
inspections, because this section does not explicitly require that such entries and inspections be made pursuant to a warrant and the Act's legislative history is silent with
respect to whether entries and inspections under 42 U.S.C. § 7525(c) must be made
pursuant to a warrant.
55. 33 U.S.c. § 1256 (Supp. V 1981). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
contains a provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) (1976), which appears to authorize warrantless entries and inspections by EPA of the premises of dischargers' pollutnnts into
waterways, that is almost identical to the provision of the Clean Air Act authorizing
entries and inspections of regulated businesses. This provision gives the EPA Administrator or his authorized representative, upon presentation of his credentials. a "right
of entry to, upon, or through any premises in which an effluent source is located" or in
which any records required to be maintained by EPA regulations under the Act arc
located, 33 U.S.c. § 1318(a)(B)(i) (1976), and a right, at reasonable times, to have
access to records required to be kept by EPA regulations under the Act, to inspect any
monitoring equipment or method required to be installed, used and maintained by
EPA regulations under the Act, and to sample any effluents which the owner or operator of such source is required to sample by EPA regulations under the Act. 33
U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B)(ii) (1976). Such entries, inspections, and sampling are not explicitly required to be made pursuant to a warrant, and presentation of credentials prior
to entry is the only procedure that the Act requires prior to entry, which might cause a
court to hold that entries, inspections and sampling under the Act are not required to
be made pursuant to a warrant. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp.
1355. 1362 (E.D. Mich. 1982), relying upon legislative history of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972, S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 62, reprimed ill
1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3668, 3729. stated in dictum that the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act does not permit warrantless inspections under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1318 or forced entry without a warrant.
Stauffer Chemical CO. V. EPA, 647 F.2d 1075, 1078-79 (10th Cir. 1981), and United
States V. Stauffer Chemical Co., 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1753 (6th Cir. July 7.
1982), state in dictum that "authorized representatives" within the meaning of 33
U.S.c. § 1318 are limited to full-time employees of EPA and do not include independent private contractors hired by EPA.
56. The EPA Administrator, and his duly designated representatives, upon
presenting appropriate credentials and a written notice, are authorized by the Safe
Drinking Water Act to enter any establishment, facility, or other property of any
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Control ACt,57 the Toxic Substances Control Act,$8 the Resource
supplier of water or other person subject to national primary drinkmg water regulations under the Act. to an applicable underground injection control program under
the Act, or to any requirement under the Act to monitor an unregulated contaminant
in drinking water, in order to determine whether the Act is being complied ....ith. 42
U.S.c. § 300j-4(b)(I) (Supp. V 1981). The Act also authorizes inspection. at reasonable times, of records. files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities, and testing of
any feature of a public water system, including its raw water source, id, which implicitly would seem to authorize the taking of water samples to test for pollutants and
contaminants. The Act appears to authorize these entries and inspections 10 be made
without a warrant, because the only procedure that the Act requires to be followed
prior to such entries and inspections is presenting appropriale credentials and aWn!ten notice to the operator of the premises and giving prior notice of an inspection 10
the state agency charged with responsibility for safe dnnking waler if the stale has
primary responsibility under the Act. 42 U.S.c. § 300j-4(b)(2) (1976).
57. 7 U.S.c. § 136-136y (Supp. 1982). The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act grants officers or employees of the EPA Administrator, for the purposes of
enforcing the Act, the right to enter, "at reasonable times, any establishment or other
place where pesticides or devices are held for distribution or sale for the purpose of
inspecting and obtaining samples of any pesticides or devices, packaged, labeled and
released for shipment, and samples of any containers or labeling for such pesticides or
devices." 7 U.S.C. § 136g(a) (Supp. 1982). See a/so 7 U.S.C. § 136f(b) (right of EPA
to inspect, apparently without a warrant, books and records required (0 be maintained under the Act). Congress apparently authorized entries, inspections. and sampling under this provision of the Acl to be made without a warrant, because
inspections under the Act can be made even if no violation is suspecled. 7 U.S.c.
§ 136g(a) (Supp. 1982), and because the only procedural requirement that the Act
requires to be followed before an inspection is that an inspector must provide the
owner, operator, or agent in charge of the premises to be inspected a written statement
as to the reason for the inspection, including a statement as to whether a violation of
the law is suspected. prior to undertaking the inspection. Id The Act. however. does
provide for issuance of warrants authorizing entry and inspection of establishments
"for purposes of enforcing the provisions" of the Act upon a showing that there is
reason to believe that the Act has been violated. 7 U.S.c. § 136g(b) (Supp. 1982). but
the Act does not state that warrants are required in order to make an authorized
entry, inspection, or sampling. This provision arguably might be interpreted as requiring "inspectors upon being denied entry to obtain a search warrant authorizing
entry and inspection" see Comment, 8 EI'o'VTL. L. REP. at 10134, on the grounds that a
warrant, in such a case of denial of entry, would be enforcing EPA's righl ofenlI)' and
inspection under 7 U.S.c. § 136g(a), and because there would be reasonable grounds
to believe that the provisions of 7 U.S.C. § 136j(2)(B) (making it unlawful for any
person to refuse to allow inspection of records or an establishment, or the taking of a
sample of any pesticide, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 136(f). (g» have been violated when
entry, inspection, or sampling previously has been refused. The Act's legi$lalive history is silent with respect to whether administrative inspections and sampling under
the Act must be made pursuant to a warrant.
58. The Toxic Substances Control Act authorizes the EPA Administrator and any
duly designated representative of the Administrator, for purposes of adrnlruslering
the Act and determining whether the requirements of the Act applicable to chemical
substances and mixtures have been complied with. "to inspect any establishment. facility, or other premises in which chemical substances or mixtures are manufactured.
processed, stored, or held before or after their distribution in commerce and any conveyance being used to transport chemical substances. mbttures, or such articles in
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Conservation and Recovery Act, S9 the Superfund Act,60 the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,61 and the Enconnection with distribution in commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 2610(a)(I) (1976). Such inspections are required to ". . . be commenced and completed with reasonable
promptness and shall be conducted at reasonable times, within reasonable limits, and
in a reasonable manner." Id. The Act does not explicitly authorize EPA to take
samples of chemical substances or mixtures on premises being inspected. Cj 15
U.S.C. § 261O(b)(I) (1976). Congress apparently intended that such entries and inspections under the Act be conducted without a warrant, because the only procedures
that the Act requires to be followed prior to entry and inspection is "the presentation
of appropriate credentials and of a written notice to the owner, operator, or agent in
charge of the premises or conveyance to be inspected," 15 U.S.C. § 261O(a) (1976),
and no reference is made to prior authorization by a warrant. The Act's legislative
history also is silent with respect to whether a warrant is required to make authorized
entries and inspections under the Act when consent to entry is denied.
59. Duly designated officers or employees of EPA, or states having an authorized
hazardous waste program, are authorized by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, for the purposes of developing or assisting in the development of any regulation or enforcing the hazardous waste provisions of the Act, to enter "at reasonable
times any establishment or other place maintained by any person where hazardous
wastes are generated, stored, treated, disposed of, or transported from," 42 U.S.C.
§ 6927(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981), and "to inspect and obtain samples from any person of
any such wastes and samples of any containers or labeling of such wastes." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6927(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981). The Act does not explicitly require a warrant in order to
conduct such authorized entries, inspections, and sampling, so the Act would probably be interpreted as authorizing warrantless inspections.
60. The Superfund Act authorizes certain federal and state officials ". . . 10 enter
at reasonable times any establishment or other place where ... hazardous substances
are or have been generated, stored, treated, or disposed of, or transported from;. . ."
and ". . . to inspect and obtain samples from any person of any such substance and
samples of any containers or labeling for such substances. Each such inspection shall
be commenced and completed with reasonable promptness." 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e)(I)
(Supp. V 1981). The Act also requires persons subject to regulation under the Act to
permit certain federal and state officials "at all reasonable times to have access to. . .
all records relating to such substances." Id. Such entries and inspections apparently
may be conducted without a warrant, because the Act does not explicitly require such
entries and inspections to be conducted pursuant to a warrant. The Superfund Act
also appears to authorize warrantless entries and inspections of commercial premises
in order to undertake removal actions, id. at § 9601(23), or remedial actions, Id. at
§ 9601(24), whenever there is a release, reason to believe that a release is about to
occur, or a substantial threat of a release, into the environment of a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial
danger to public health or welfare. Id. at § 9604(a), (b).
61. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act directs the Secretary of
Interior to "cause to be made such inspections of any surface coal mining and reclamation operations as are necessary to evaluate the administration of approved State
programs, or to develop or enforce any Federal program," and for such purposes
grants "authorized representatives of the Secretary. . . a right of entry to, upon, Of
through any surface coal mining and reclamation operations." 30 U.S.C. § 1267(a)
(Supp. V 1981). The Act also grants authorized representatives of the regulatory authority (the Secretary of Interior or a state with an approved enforcement program
under the Act), without advance notice and upon presentation of appropriate credentials, "the right of entry to, upon, or through any surface coal mining and reclamation
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dangered Species Act. 62
Several other federal environmental protection statutes appear
to authorize warrantless administrative inspections of regulated
commercial premises either pursuant to regulations adopted by an
administrative agency or pursuant to permit or license conditions.
The Atomic Energy Act authorizes the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to adopt regulations with respect to inspection of businesses regulated by the Act (which include nuclear power
reactors);63 Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations implementing this statutory authorization64 have been interpreted as
authorizing warrantless administrative inspections of commercial
premises regulated by the Act. 65 The Marine Protection, Research
and Sanctuaries Act requires that permits for the ocean dumping
of materials issued by the Environmental Protection Agency or
the Army Corps of Engineers "shall include ... any special provisions deemed necessary ..." by the agency issuing the permit
for monitoring and surveillance of the transportation or dumping
operations" or any premises in which any records required to be maintamed under
the Act are located, and "at reasonable times and without delay. the right of access to
and to copy any records. and to inspect any monitoring equipment or method of
operation required under the Act." 30 U.S.C. § 1267(b)(3) (SUpp. V 1981). The Act
does not explicitly authorize warrantless seizures of pollutant samples. although persons regulated under the Act are required to take and evaluate pollutant samples and
inspectors are authorized under the Act to evaluate records of such sampling. 30
U.S.c. § 1267(b) (Supp. V 1981).
62. 16 U.S.c. §§ 1531-1543 (Supp. 1982). The Endangered Species Act requires
that a person engaged in business as an importer or exponer of certain endangered or
threatened species of wildlife or fish
... at all reasonable times upon notice by a duly authonzed representative of the
Secretary [of Interior). afford such representative access to his place of busmcss, an
opportunity to examine his inventory of imported fish. wildlife, or plants and the
records required to be kept under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph ...
16 U.S.c. § 1538(d)(2)(B) (1976). No warrant is required by the Act in order to make
such entries and inspections.
The Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978. 42 U.S.C. §§ 20142201,7901-7942 (Supp. V 1981), authorizes states. pursuant to cooperative agreements
with the federal government, to enter an inactive uranium mill tailing site "at any
time" to make inspections in furtherance of remedial actions to minimize radiation
health hazards to the public. 42 U.S.c. § 7913(d) (Supp. V 1981). Such entnes, which
are not explicitly required to be conducted pursuant to a warrant, appear to be permitted only when such remedial actions have the consent of persons holding record
interest in the site, id at § 7913(c), or when the state has acquired the site. ld at
§ 7914(a). Consequently, the Act does not actually authorize warrantless administrative inspections of privately owned uranium mill tailing sites over the objection of the
owners of such sites.
63. 42 U.S.c. §§ 2201(0), 2035(c) (1976).
64. 10 C.F.R. § 30.52(a) (1982).
65. NRC v. Radiation Technology. Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1266 (D.NJ. 1981).
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of the material;66 this provision would appear to authorize permits
issued under the Act to require warrantless boarding and inspection of vessels and planes transporting materials pursuant to a permit issued under the Act. The Outer Continental Shelf Act
authorizes the Secretary of Interior to "prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out provisions ..." of
the Act,67 which arguably would authorize regulations subjecting
oil and gas drill platforms on lands leased under the Act to warrantless entry and inspection by government officials. Regulations
adopted under the Act, however, do not appear to authorize warrantless entry and inspection of drill platforms on lands leased
under the Act.68
Warrantless entry and inspection of commercial premises are
not authorized by the solid waste disposal regulatory provisions of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,69 the Coastal Zone
Management Act,1° the Marine Mammal Protection Act,71 or the
Noise Control Act.72
2.

Pervasive Regulation

In addition to requiring implicit statutory authorization of warrantless conduct, the pervasively regulated industry exception also
requires, as its name implies, that the industry be pervasively regulated. 73 This requirement follows from Donovan v. Dewey's
33 U.S.c. § 1414(a)(5) (1976). See also § 1417(c).
43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1976).
See 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.38-.39 (1981).
42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (Supp. 1982).
71. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (Supp. 1982). Balel0 v. Klutznick, 519 F. Supp. 573
(S.D. Cal. 1981), a case decided after Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981), but
which did not cite it, held that a regulation adopted by the Secretary of Commerce, 50
C.F.R. § 216.24(f) (authorizing federal observers to board tuna fishing vessels for research purposes and to determine if civil or criminal violations of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407, take place), violated both the fourth
amendment and the Act because the Act does not authorize such warrantless boarding and inspections of vessels by federal observers. Bale/o, however, did not address
the constitutionality of 16 U.S.C. § 1377(d) (Supp. V 1981), which authorizes government officials to make warrantless searches of vessels when there is probable cause to
believe that violations of the Act are occurring, and to make warrantless seizures of
cargo on such vessels.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
73. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982);
Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1976); Commonwealth v. Lipomi, 385 Mass. 370, 432 N.E. 2d 86 (1982); State ex reI. Environmental
Improvement Agency v. Albuquerque Publishing Co., 91 N.M. 125, 571 P.2d 117
(1977), cerl. denied, 435 U.S. 956 (1978). "The enterprise sought to be inspected must
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

1982]

ENVIRONMENTAL INSPECTIONS

93

statement that "some statutes 'apply only to a single industry,
where regulations might already be so pervasive that [the pervasively regulated industry] exception to the warrant requirement
could apply.' "74
The Supreme Court has not explicitly defined the extent to
which an industry must be subject to statutory regulation in order
to be a pervasively regulated industry that can be subject to warrantless administrative inspections under the pervasively regulated industry exception. Donovan v. Dewey held that application
of the exception is not limited to industries with a long tradition of
close government supervision and regulation. but
the duration of a particular regulatory scheme will often be an important factor in determining whether it is sufficiently pervasive to
make the imposition of a warrant requirement unnecessary. But if
the length of regulation were the only criterion, absurd results
would occur . . . . [N]ew or emerging industries, including ones
such as the nuclear power industry that pose enormous potential
safety and health problems, could never be subject to warrantless
searches even under the most carefully structured inspection program simply because of the recent vintage of regulatioD. 7s

Colonnade Catering Corp. ~'. United States 76 approved a federal
statute that subjected businesses distributing alcoholic beverages
to warrantless administrative inspections. 77 The Supreme Court
be engaged in a pervasively regulated business. The presence of this factor lDSures
that warrantless inspection will pose only a minimal threat to Justifiable expectations
of privacy." Dunlop v. Henzler Enterprises. Inc.. 418 F. Supp.. at 631-32.
74. Donovan v. Dewey. 452 U.S .. at 601-02. quoting Marshall \'. Barlow·s. Inc..
436 U.S. at 321.
75. 452 U.S. at 606, This holding rejected the position taken by Justice Stewart m
dissent. Justice Stewart argued that warrantless administrative searches are permuted
under the fourth amendment only in the case of businesses that are in an industry that
is both pervasively regulated and that has "a long tradition of close government supervision. of which any person choosing to enter such a business must be aware." Id
at 610-12. He argued that the reason for this rule is that a busmessman m such an
industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him. Id at 612. He argued
that this was the holding in Marshall v. BarloW'S. Inc.. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). and that
the majority had misstated the holding in Barlow's. JUStice Stewart asserted m dissent
that "it can hardly be said that a businessman consents to restrictions on hIS busmess
when those restrictions are not imposed until cifter he has entered the business." 452
U.S. at 612. but stated that this "is precisely what the Court says today to many stone
quarry operators." Id Justice Stewart concluded his dissent by arguing that the majority's opinion allows Congress "to avoid the Fourth Amendment industry by industry" by defining "any industry as dangerous" and regulating it "substantially." Id at
613-14.
76. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
77. In Colonnade Carering Corp .• 397 U.S. 72. federal agenlS. without a warrant
and without the owner's consent, forcibly entered a storeroom at a catering establish-
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noted that the statute required liquor distillers to pay an excise tax
on distilled spirits and be subject to inspection by federal officers,
and required retail sellers of alcoholic beverages to have a federal
license and a federal tax stamp and to be subject to federal inspections. 78 In United States v. Biswelf,19 which upheld a federal statute-the Gun Control Act of 1968,80 which made firearm dealers
subject to warrantless inspections81 -the Supreme Court pointed
out that the Gun Control Act subjected importers, manufacturers,
dealers, and collectors of firearms to a program of licensing, inspection, and special taxes. 82 These two cases might be interpreted
as implicitly holding that an industry, in order to be subject to
warrantless inspections under the pervasively regulated industry
exception, must be required to obtain a permit or license, to pay
special taxes, and to be inspected. None of the federal environmental protection statutes explicitly subject the industries that
ment and seized bottles of liquor which they suspected of being refilled in violation of
26 U.S.C. § 530I(c). The owner of the catering establishment brought suit to obtain
the return of the seized liquor and to have the liquor suppressed as evidence. The
Supreme Court affirmed the District Court, which had granted the requested relief.
on the grounds that Congress had not authorized federal agents to make forcible entries, without a warrant, of establishments such as those of the petitioner (owner of
the catering establishment). See supra text accompanying note 51. The court stated.
in dictum, that the fourth amendment would not prohibit Congress from authorizing
warrantless inspections of the liquor industry and forcible, unconsented entries of
commercial premises in the liquor industry. 397 U.S. at 76-77. But the Court held
that Congress had made imposition of a criminal fine for refusal to permit entry by a
federal inspector the exclusive sanction under the relevant statute for denial of entry.
397 U.S. at 77.
78. 397 U.S. at 72-73, 75.
79. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
80. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976).
81. In Biswell, a pawnshop operator, who was federally licensed to deal in sporting
weapons under the Gun Control Act of 1968, consented to a warrantless entry to a
locked gun storeroom by federal agents, after being told by the agents, when he asked
if they had a search warrant, that the Act authorized warrantless inspection of the
storeroom. The agents found two sawed-off rifles which the operator was not licensed
to possess under the Act; subsequently, the operator was indicted and convicted under
the Act for dealing in firearms without having paid a special occupational tax. The
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, reversing the holding of the Court of Appeals
that the sawed-off rifles had been illegally seized in violation of the fourth amendment because of the lack of a search warrant. The Supreme Court held that the Act's
authorization of warrantless regulatory searches of gun dealers does not violate the
fourth amendment, on the grounds that warrantless inspections are necessary under
the Act in order to give federal agents the flexibility in time, scope, and frequency of
inspection that is required to further the Act's "urgent interest" of preventing violent
crime, and that gun dealers accepting a federal license under the Act do so with the
knowledge that they will be subject to inspection to determine compliance with specified standards. 406 U.S. at 316, 317.
82. 406 U.S. at 311-12, 313 n.2.
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they regulate to license or permit, special taxes, and inspection requirements. A number of federal environmental protection statutes, however, subject industrial and commercial facilities to
permit or license and inspection requirements, but not to special
taxes. S3
On the other hand, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act,84
whose warrantless inspection provisions were upheld in Donm'an
v. Dewey, makes mine operators subject to regulations to protect
the health and safety of mine workers, but does not subject the
mine operators to license or permit requirements or to special
taxes. Donovan v. Dewey consequently might be interpreted as
implicitly making an industry "pervasively regulated" if a statute
subjects the industry's operations that may adversely affect human
life or safety to regulation and to inspection. Under this interpretation, a federal environmental protection statute, which attempts
to protect public health and safety by regulating industrial and
commercial facilities in part through warrantless entries and inspections, could be held to pervasively regulate an industry.8~
83. The Clean Water Act requires point sources to have a permn In order to dl5charge pollutants into waters of the United States. 33 U.S.c. §§ 1311. 1342 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). and makes such sources subject to government inspecuon. Id at
§ 1318 (1976). The Marine Protection. Research and Sanctuaries Act requIres that a
permit be obtained in order to dump material in the ocean. 33 U.S.c. § 1411(a)
(1976); such permits may require that vessels or planes transponlng material to be
dumped in the ocean be subject to warrantless boarding and inspection. See supra
text accompanying note 66. The Clean Air Act makes businesses emitting pollutants
into the ambient air subject to inspection. 42 U.S.c. § 7414 (SUpp. v 1981). and requires in cenain circumstances that a permit be obtained in order to construct a new
source or to modify or reconstruct an existing source. Id. at §§ 7410(a)(2)(D). 7475.
7502(b)(6) (Supp. V 1981). Under the Resource Conservation and Reco\'ery Act. hazardous waste disposal facilities cannot operate unless they have a permit. 42 U.S.c.
§ 6925 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). and are subject to inspection. Id at § 6927 (Supp. V
1981). Similarly. the distribution and sale of pesticides are prohibited under the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act unless the pesticide 15 registered. 7 V.S.c.
§ 136a (Supp. 1982). and establishments hOlding pesticides or pesuclde deVICes for
distribution or sale are subject to inspection. Id. at § 136g (SUpp. 1982). Nuclear
power plants are required by the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.c. §§ 2011-2296 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). to obtain construction permits and operating licenses. and are subJect
to warrantless entry and inspection. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65. The
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. 30 U.S.c. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp.
V 1981), requires a permit to engage in surface coal mining operallons. and subJects
surface coal mining operations to warrantless inspections. See supra note 61.
84. 30 U.S.c. §§ 801-961 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
85. A number of the federal environmental protection statutes that authonzc: warrantless entries and inspections of private commercIal propeny would be conSIdered
to pervasively regulate industry under this interpretation. The Clean Air Act regulates the emission of pollutants into the ambient air to protect public health and welfare. 42 U.S.c. § 7401 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Federal Water Pollution Control
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Single Industry

Donovan v. Dewey's reference to a pervasively regulated "single
industry" indicates that a statute can authorize warrantless administrative inspections only of a "single industry." But the Supreme
Court has not defined what constitutes a "single industry." As
noted earlier, the Supreme Court has held that the alcoholic beverage industry,86 gun dealers,87 and underground and surface
mines88 could be made subject to warrantless administrative inspections. However, these three examples do not provide a clear
definition of what is a "single industry." The "alcoholic beverage
industry" appears to include distillers, vintners, brewers, and importers as well as retailers, wholesalers, and caterers 89 dealing
with many types of liquors. 9o The gun industry includes firearms
and ammunition importers, manufacturers, retailers (dealers), and
collectors (purchasers),91 and the mining industry includes underAct regulates the discharge of pollutants into the waters of the United States both to
"restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters," 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), and to protect public health. See
33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981); Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir.
1978). Similarly, the distribution of public drinking water supplies is regulated by the
Safe Drinking Water Act to protect public health. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981). The Safe Drinking Water Act also regulates the underground injection of
pollutants that might endanger public drinking water supplies. Id. at § 300h(b)(I). In
order to protect the health and welfare of the public, the Noise Control Act directs
EPA to establish noise control standards for certain products and transportation
equipment. 42 U.S.C. § 4901 (a) (b) (1976). Finally, the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 imposes environmental protection and reclamation standards upon surface coal mine operators to protect human life and safety and the
environment. 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V 1981). Ifa statute must regulate activities of
an industry to protect human health and safety in order to be a statute that pervasively regulates that industry, statutes whose purpose is to protect natural resources or
wildlife, see supra notes 7 and 8, would not meet this requirement.
The chemical manufacturing industry, however, has been held not to be an industry that is pervasively regulated by the Clean Air Act, so that the chemical manufacturing industry is not subject to warrantless inspections under the Clean Air Act
pursuant to J)onovan v. J)ewey. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp.
1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982). J)ow Chemical Co. also indicated in dictum that all of the
industries that are regulated by the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act arc not
pervasively regulated by those two statutes and may not be inspected without a warrant under J)onovan v. J)ewey's pervasively regulated industry exception. Id. at 1278.
See Martin, EPA and Administrative Inspections, 7 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123. 131-32
(1979).
86. See supra note 77.
87. See supra note 81.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45.
89. See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 72-77.
90. See 26 U.S.C. § 5146(b) (1976), quoted in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72, 73 (1970).
91. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 312 n.1.
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ground and surface mines involved in recovery of many varied
types of minerals and substances. 92 Consequently, a "single industry" within the meaning of the pervasively regulated industry
exception may be very broadly defined as including persons involved in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of a particular
product, as well as purchasers of the product and persons using
the same type of manufacturing or industrial process even though
they manufacture or process different types of products or materials. Under this interpretation, the surface coal mines regulated by
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act93 clearly would
qualify as a "single industry," since all underground and surface
mines were considered to be a "single industry" in Donovan v.
Dewey. Similarly, under this interpretation, manufacturers,
processors, and distributors of chemical substances who are regulated by and subject to warrantless inspections under the Toxic
Substances Control Act,94 and sellers and distributors of pesticides
who are regulated by and subject to warrantless inspections under
the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act,9S would constitute a pervasively regulated single industry that may be subject to
warrantless inspections under the Acts. Although manufacturers,
processors, and distributors of chemical substances and mixtures,
which are subject to warrantless entries and inspections under the
Toxic Substances Control Act, are a single industry subject to the
pervasively regulated industry exception, the Act also provides for
warrantless entries and inspections of premises where chemical
substances and mixtures are stored or held after distribution in
commerce. 96 This provision would authorize warrantless entries
and inspections of purchasers and conveyancers of chemical substances and mixtures, thus potentially affecting a wide variety of
businesses.97 Although manufacturers, distributors, and purchasers of a particular product may be viewed as a single industry
under the pervasively regulated industry exception, the Supreme
Court has not addressed the question of whether commercial carriers of a product, such as railroads and trucks, can be considered
to be part of the same industry as the manufacturers, distributors,
and purchasers of the product.98
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See 452 U.S. at 596 n.2. 597-98 n.4.
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. V 1981).
15 u.s.c. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
7 U.s.c. § 136-136y (Supp. 1982).
See supra note 58.
Id
A similar issue arises under the Marine Protection. Research. and Sanctuanes

98

JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 3:75

On the other hand, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. ,99 arguably indicates that a "single industry" within the pervasively regulated industry exception cannot be defined on the basis of general dangers
to a class of people, such as employees, created by businesses, if
such a definition would subject businesses in a wide variety of industries to regulation under a specific statute. IOO By analogy, the
businesses regulated by the Clean Air Act lOl and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act,102 which regulate businesses in a
wide variety of industrial categories, would not be a "single industry" within the meaning of the pervasively regulated industry exception. Similarly, the warrantless inspection provisions of the
hazardous wastes regulatory and liability provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 103 and the Superfund
Act lO4 may not satisfy the requirements of the pervasively regulated industry exception because they do not regulate a "single
industry." Both Acts regulate and subject to liability and warrantless inspections 105 persons and businesses that generate, transport,
and dispose of hazardous wastes. But although businesses engaged in the transport and disposal of hazardous wastes as a priAct, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp. v 1981), which regulates and subjects to
warrantless inspections vessels and airplanes transporting materials for the purpose of
dumping them in ocean waters. Persons subject to the Act would include businesses
engaged in transporting materials into ocean waters for the purpose of dumping them;
such businesses might be considered to be a "single industry." But the Act would also
apply to generators of waste materials who transport such materials to ocean waters
for the purpose of dumping them. Waste generators might be businesses in many
separate and distinct industries.
Nuclear power plants generating electricity, which are regulated by the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), as well as facilities and sites
where uranium mill tailings are stored or disposed of (which are regulated by the
Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 7901 (Supp. v 1981», would
also seem to be single industries that may be subjected to warrantless inspections.
99. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
100. The Barlow's court required a warrant for unconsented entries and inspections under section 8(a) of OSHA, but stated that "some . . . statutes cited apply only
to a single industry, where regulations might already be so pervasive that a Colonnade Biswell exception to the warrant requirement could apply." 436 U.S. at 321.
Section 8(a) of OSHA, 29 U.S.c. § 657(a)(1976), authorizes representatives of the
Secretary of Labor to conduct inspections of businesses engaged in or affecting interstate commerce to determine whether there is compliance with health and safety standards promulgated under the Act. Virtually all commercial establishment!; in the
United States are subject to regulation and inspection under section 8(a) of OSHA.
See supra Note, 9 ENVTL. L. 149, 199 n.33.
101. 42 U.S.c. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. V 1981).
102. 33 U.S.c. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
103. 42 U.S.c. §§ 6901-6986 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
104. 42 U.S.c. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V 1981).
105. See supra notes 59 and 60.
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mary function may be a single industry that can be subject to
warrantless inspections, businesses in many different industries
may incidentally transport and dispose of hazardous wastes which
they generate. The public drinking water systems that are regulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act lO6 are a single industry that
may be subject to warrantless inspections under the Act. However, businesses in numerous and diverse industries may be engaged in underground injection of pollutants (subsurface
emplacement of fluids by well injection).I07 Because such businesses are not a pervasively regulated single industry, they cannot
be subject under the Act to warrantless inspections under the pervasively regulated industry exception. 108
4.

Reasonableness of Search

According to Donovan v. Dewey, warrantless administrative inspections of commercial property may be reasonable searches
(and thus within the pervasively regulated industry exception)
when Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless
searches are "necessary to further a regulatory scheme. . . ."109
In order to meet this criterion, "'... warrantless inspection must
be a crucial part of a regulatory scheme designed to further an
urgent [governmental] interest.' "110 The Supreme Court held in
106. 42 U.S.c. §§ 300f-3OOj-1O, 7401-7626 (Supp. V 1981).
107. See id at § 3OOh(d)(I).
108. Similar issues may arise under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, 42
U.S.c. §§ 2011-2296 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), that subject users of radioactive material
who are licensed and regulated under the Act to warrantless inspections. See NRC v.
Radiation Technology, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1266 (D.N.I. 1981). Because such licensees
may be in different industries that use radioactive materials for different purposes, all
licensees are not within the same industry.
109. 452 U.S. at 600. The Coun in Donol'on I~ De....e)' alternatively stated that a
warrant may not be constitutionally required when there is a "strong federal interest
in conducting unannounced warrantless inspections," id. but that warrantless administrative inspection programs may violate the founh amendment if they "are unnecessary for the funherance of federal interests." Id at 599.
110. Commonwealth v. Lipomi, 385 Mass. 370,432 N.E.2d 86. 93 (1982) (quotmg
Dunlop v. Henzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627. 631-32 (D.N.M. 1976». See
State ex rel Environmental Improvement Agency v. Albuquerque Publishing Co., 91
N.M. 125.571 P.2d 117 (1977). cerl. denied. 435 U.S. 956 (1978) (reaching same result
in case decided prior to Donovan v. Dewey). With regard to the reasonable scope of a
regulatory inspection, see Public Service Co. v. EPA. 509 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ind.
1981), which held that an inspection of aU areas of commercial premISes havmg a
direct bearing on the emission of pollutants and the taking of photographs of equIpment on the premises. pursuant to a warrant issued under the Clean Air Act. 42
U.S.c. § 7414 (Supp. V 1981). did not violate the founh amendment or the Clean AIr
Act. The coun, citing Michigan v. Tyler. 436 U.S. 449 (1978). and Camara v. MUDlCIpal Coun, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). held that the determination of the permISSible scope of
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Donovan v. Dewey that the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act III
met this requirement because Congress reasonably could determine that a system of warrantless inspections was necessary for
the proper enforcement of the statute and for inspections to be
effective. 112 The Court referred to legislative history of the Act
which indicated that Congress had believed that a warrant requirement would give advance notice or warning of inspections
and that advance notice of inspections would result in concealment of safety or health hazards in mines. 113 The Court also
quoted with approval l14 the statements in United States v. Bisweill IS that "if inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible
deterrent, unannounced, ever frequent, inspections are essential.
In this context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate
inspection."116 The Court in Biswell did not refer to the possibilan administrative inspection involves a weighing of the need to search against privacy
interests and consideration of the language of an agency's enabling statute and the
facts of a particular case. In upholding the inspections at issue, Public Service Co.
noted that the inspections lasted only several hours, did not result in plant shutdowns
or loss of generating capacity, and did not result in the seizure of secret or classified
information. 509 F. Supp. at 725. Accord, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536
F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 7414 does not authorize
EPA to use aerial surveillance and photography).
On the other hand, Joe Flynn Rare Coins, Inc. v. Stephan, 526 F. Supp. 1275 (D.
Kan. 1981), held that a statute that authorized law enforcement officers to make warrantless inspections of "any and every part" of the business premises of pawnbrokers
and precious metal dealers "to search for and to take into possession any article
known or believed to have been stolen" could not be upheld under the pervasively
regulated industry exception because, in part, "the scope of the search and seizure is
virtually unlimited, or, at the very least, includes articles other than 'precious metals,'" 526 F. Supp. at 1286. The court noted that the statute at issue in Biswell was
"specifically limited in scope to conducting a search for firearms. Here, the entire
business premise [sic], and any articles therein, are subject to search and seizure." Id.
Ill. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-961 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
112. 452 U.S. at 602-03.
113. Id. at 603. Justice Stewart argued in dissent that this expressed fear that the
obtaining of a warrant would give advance notice to a mine operator of the forthcoming inspection was groundless, because warrants are issued ex parte, because the time
of execution of a warrant does not have to be made known to a mine operator if a
warrant is obtained after the operator refuses to consent to an inspection, and because
a warrant can be issued in accordance with an administrative plan based on specific
objective criteria in advance of the planned inspection when it is anticipated that
consent will not be given for an inspection. Id. at 612 n.5 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See Bionic Auto Parts and Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582, 586 (N.D. Ill.
1981).
114. 452 U.S. at 603.
115. 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
116. In addition, Donovan v. Dewey noted that there is a substantial federal interest in improving the health and safety conditions in underground and surface mines.
452 U.S. at 602. The Court, citing the Act's legislative history, found that "Congress
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ity of giving advance notice of inspections, or to the ease with
which gun dealers could conceal violations, but instead indicated
that warrantless inspections of gun dealers are needed to provide
"necessary flexibility as to time, scope, and frequency [of inspections] . . . ."117 Because Biswell was cited approvingly by Donovan v. Dewey several times,118 Donovan v. Dewey should be
interpreted as permitting a regulatory statute to authorize periodic, unannounced warrantless inspections of commercial property either when the legislature reasonably determines that
obtaining a warrant might give advance notice of an inspection
was plainly aware that the mining industry is among the most hazardous in the country and that the poor health and safety record of this industry has significant deleterious effects on interstate commerce." Id The Supreme Coun also noted that the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, unlike OSHA. was "narrowly and explicitly
directed at inherently dangerous industrial activity." id at 602 n.7. and "applies to
industrial activity with a notorious history of serious accidents and unhealthful working conditions." Id at 603. These statements by the Coun might be interpreted as
implicitly limiting warrantless administrative inspections of commercial propeny
under the pervasively regulated industry exception to statutes that regulate activities
of industries that are significantly more hazardous to health and safety than most
other industries. Such an interpretation arguably is consistent with United States v.
Biswell. 406 U.S. 311. 315-16 (1972). where the Supreme Coun. while upholding warrantless administrative inspections of gun dealers under the Gun Control Act of 1968.
18 U.S.c. §§ 921-928 (1976). noted that the purposes of the Gun Control Act of 1968
were to prevent violent crime and to assist the states in regulating the firearms traffic
within their borders. by assuring that weapons are distributed through regular channels and in a traceable manner and by preventing sales of weapons to undesirable
customers. If this interpretation of Donovan v. Dewey was followed. warrantless administrative inspections under federal environmental protection statutes. such as the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (Supp. V 1981). and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1981). each presenting different
degrees of harm or threat of harm to the public and the environment. would violate
the fourth amendment. Such an interpretation of Dono.'an v. Dewey. however. is inconsistent with Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). and
earlier statements in Donovan v. Dewey that warrantless inspection programs satisfy
the pervasively regulated industry exception when Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless inspections are necessary to further federal interests. 452 U.S,
at 599. and a regulatory scheme. Id at 600. In Colonnade Catering Cop.• the
Supreme Coun indicated that the reason for warrantless inspections of the liquor
industry was to protect "the revenue against various types of fraud." by insuring the
collection of duties and excise taxes. 397 U.S. at 75. not the protection of the health
and safety of consumers of alcoholic beverages and minors. Colonnade Catering
Cop., which was cited approvingly in Dono.'an v. Dewey. 452 U.S. at 598-99. 605-06.
would seem to indicate that warrantless administrative inspection programs are not
limited to statutes whose purposes are to protect against significant threats or hazards
to health and safety, but may be included as pan of any valid regulatory scheme
where Congress has found that a warrantless inspection program is necessary for
proper enforcement.
117. 406 U.S. at 316.
118. 452 U.S. at 598-606.
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and violations could be easily concealed (Donovan v. Dewey), or
that flexibility in the time, scope, and frequency of inspections is
necessary to deter violations (United States v. Biswell).119 Because
periodic unannounced inspections of pollution control equipment
and business premises reasonably could be found by Congress to
be necessary to deter violations of pollution control and environmental protection standards, the provisions of each of the federal
pollution control and environmental protection statutes analyzed
in this article satisfy Donovan v. Dewey's requirement that a warrantless inspection must be necessary to further federal interests.
According to Donovan v. Dewey, warrantless administrative inspections may be unreasonable searches that violate the Fourth
Amendment if they occur so randomly, infrequently, or unpredictably "that the owner, for all practical purposes, has no real
expectation that his property will from time to time be inspected
by government officials."120 The Court further stated that under
the pervasively regulated industry exception, a statute must specify its procedures and reasonable legislative or administrative
standards to guide inspectors. 121 The Court noted by example Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 122 in which "the assurance
of regularity provided by a warrant"123 was unnecessary in administrative inspections of the alcoholic beverages industry because of the long-time close supervision and inspection of the
industry.124 The Court also recalled upholding the inspection pro119. Bionic Auto Parts and Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582, 585 n.1 (N.D.
Ill. 1981), held that a legislature "can reasonably impose strict regulations on a legiti·
mate industry in which the potential for illegal conduct is great." The court in Folmer
held that the used automobile parts business was an industry that could be subjected
to warrantless administrative inspections under Donovan v. Dewey, because of "(I) the
large 'industry' in stolen motor vehicles (especially facilitated by the mobility of the
vehicles themselves) and (2) the major problem of the so·called 'chop shops' with
their ability to strip and disassemble vehicles with great speed. . . ." 518 F. Supp. at
585. The court, therefore, held that the statute in question subjecting used auto parts
businesses to warrantless administrative inspections satisfied the "first requirement"
of J)onovan v. J)ewey-"that of defining a regulatable industry where a 'warrant reo
quirement clearly might impede the "specific enforcement needs" of the Act. . . .'''
518 F. Supp. at 585 (citations omitted). NRC v. Radiation Technology, Inc., 519 F.
Supp. 1266, 1289 (D.N.J. 1981), interpreted J)onovan v. J)ewey as permitting a statute
to provide for warrantless inspections when a warrant requirement might impede en·
forcement of the statute.
120. 452 U.S. at 599.
121. Id
122. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
123. 452 U.S. at 599.
124. Id at 600.
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visions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 125 in United States v. Biswell 126 on the basis of "a sufficiently comprehensive and
predictable inspection scheme" and "the strong federal interest in
conducting unannounced, warrantless inspections." 127
On the other hand, the Donovan Court noted that warrantless
inspections under section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA)128 had been held unconstitutional in Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc. 129 because certain criteria had not been met.
First, the OSHA provision failed to tailor administrative inspections to the particular health and safety concerns posed by the various businesses regulated by the statute. Instead, it authorized
administrative inspections of any workplace and of all pertinent
conditions and structures in a workplace. 130 Furthermore, it did
not provide standards to guide inspectors in the exercise of their
authority to select and to search establishments, instead providing
only that such searches must be performed at reasonable times,
within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner.131 Commenting on Barlow's, the Donovan Court recognized that that
holding had curtailed the "almost unbridled discretion" 132 of
OSHA officials by requiring warrants issued on the basis of neutral criteria, but Donovan emphasized that the Barlow's holding
was expressly limited to the inspection provisions of OSHA, and
stated that, under other statutes, the "reasonableness of a warrantless search . . . will depend upon the specific needs and privacy
guarantees of each statute." 133
Applying the criteria of Colonnade, Biswell. and Barlow's. the
125. 18 U.S.c. §§ 921-928 (1976).
126. 406 U.S. 311 (1972). Donol'an v. Dewey also quoted, at 452 U.S. at 600. the
following passage from Biswell:
It is also plain that inspections for compliance with the Gun Control Act pose only
limited threats to the dealer's justifiable expectations of privacy. When a dealer
chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business ... , he does so WIth
knowledge that his records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to elTecuve
inspection. . . . The dealer is not left to wonder about the purposes of the inspector
or the limits of his task.
406 U.S. at 316.
127. 452 U.S. at 600.
128. 29 U.S.c. § 657(a) (1976).
129. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
130. 452 U.S. at 601.
131. /d

132. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 601 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. at 323).
133. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 601-02 (quoting Marshall \'. Barlow's, InC.,
436 U.S. at 321).
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Supreme Court in Donovan v. Dewey held that the certainty and
regularity of application of the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act's inspection program provided a constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant,134 finding that the Act is tailored to address the specific concerns of mining operations and that it imposes regulations sufficiently pervasive and defined that owners of
subject property "cannot help but be aware" that their facilities
will be inspected. 13S The Court stressed that the Act requires in134. 452 U.S. at 603.
135. Id. at 603 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S., at
316). Justice Stewart argued in dissent that the "cannot help but be aware" limitation
is "meaningless" because "the Court never explains how operators of stone quarries
could possibly be aware that the quarries would be subject to warrantless inspections
until Congress told them they would be." Id. at 611-12 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
United States v. Gordon, 655 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1981), held that the insurance business in the State of New York could be made subject to warrantless administrative
inspections and seizure of business documents by state officials, because the insurance
business had been "subject to a long-standing, complex, and pervasive pattern of regulation by the State of New York," so that a person engaged in the business has his
"expectation of privacy ... substantially reduced" and "is deemed to have consented
to the regulatory restrictions placed upon him." 655 F.2d at 483. The majority in
Gordon did not find that the warrantless entry and inspection of defendant's office
was explicitly authorized by statute, although they indicated that the inspection was
authorized by state law, 655 F.2d at 484. Judge Oakes, though concurring in Gordon,
argued that IJonovan v. IJewey was not applicable because the case did not involve a
statute that provided for periodic inspections and that tailored the scope and frequency of administrative inspections to the particular health and safety concerns
presented by the regulated businesses. 655 F.2d at 487. See supra text accompanying
notes 49-53. (The Supreme Court has held that searches by state agents are governed
by the same standards under the fourth amendment that govern federal agents. Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) ("[T]he standard of reasonableness is the same
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."). See Bionic Auto Parts and Sales,
Inc. v. Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1981), which applied IJonovon v. IJewey in
holding unconstitutional a state statute subjecting used automobile part dealers to
warrantless administrative inspections.)
See United States v. Rucinski, 658 F.2d 741 (lOth Cir. 1981), where the court, after
holding, as discussed in note 59 supra, that warrantless administrative inspections are
not always required to be conducted pursuant to a regulatory scheme established by a
statute, held that warrantless telescopic observations of operations of defendant's employees on the defendant's lumber company's private property, by Forest Service
agents stationed on adjacent private property, did not violate the fourth amendment.
After noting the federal interest in conducting this inspection through telescopic observations, see supra note 109, the court implicitly recognized the minimal intrusion
on defendant's privacy by these observations by noting that no property was seized or
molested and that the objects observed by the Forest Service agents were in plain
view and were observed under circumstances in which the defendant could not contend that he could not anticipate the observations which were made. 658 F.2d at 745.
"The defendant could not help being aware that the logs he had harvested under his
contract with a government agency would be subject to unannounced inspections undertaken for the specific purpose of determining whether any manipulation of sample
loads of logs was taking place. . . . Nor was this inspection so random, infrequent,
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spection of all mines and specifically defines the frequency of inspection 136 rather than leaving that decision to the discretion of
agency officials. 137 In upholding the constitutionality of the Act's
or unpredictable that defendant, for all practicable purposes. had no real expectation
that the logging operation would not be subjected to unannounced inspections from
time to time by Forest Service officials." Id (Citations omitted.)
136. 452 U.S. at 603-04. The Court noted that under the Act all surface mines
must be inspected at least twice annually and all underground mines must be inspected at least four times annually. 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. V 1981); all mining
operations that generate explosive gases must be inspected at irregular 5. 10. or 15day intervals. 30 U.S.c. § 813(i) (Supp. V 1981); the Secretary must conduct foUowup inspections of mines where violations of the Act previously have been discovered.
30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. v 1981); and the Secretary must inspect a mine unmediately if notified by a miner or a miner's representative that a violation of the Act or an
imminently dangerous condition exists. 30 U.S.C. § 813(g) (Supp. V 1981). 452 U.S.
at 604. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether warrantless inspections may
be made under the pervasively regulated industry exception when the inspection is
not a routine one but is prompted by a belief that statutory or regulatory violations
will be found. The several sections of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act cited
above, however. authorize warrantless inspections when violations have occurred previously or are suspected.
Some lower courts, on the other hand, have held that the pervasively regulated
industry exception does not apply when the search that is being challenged was "not a
routine, periodic search but rather. a search undertaken because government officials
have 'cause to believe' they will find evidence of a crime ...•" People v. Hedges. 447
N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1012 (1982), because in such a case "the search is in the nature of a
criminal search. rather than an administrative or regulatory search. As such. it cannot
be said that the search is necessary to further a regulatory scheme. As a result, [such a
search] fails to meet the Biswell-Colonnade exception." Joe Flynn Rare Coins. Inc. v.
Stephan, 526 F. Supp. 1275. 1285 (D. Kan. 1981). In such cases. the search must be
conducted pursuant to a warrant issued "upon a traditional showing of probable
cause applicable to searches for evidence of crime." People v. Hedges. 447 N. Y.S.2d
at 1012. quoting Michigan v. Tyler. 436 U.S. 499.512 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
137. See Bionic Auto Parts and Sales, Inc. v. Fahner. 518 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill.
1981). which held that a state statute authorizing warrantless administrative inspections of the used automobile parts industry "at any reasonable time during the day or
night" violated the fourth amendment and did not come within Donol"an .'. Dewey's
pervasively regulated industry exception to the warrant requirement, because it gave
unbridled discretion as to when to search and whom to search. The court in Falmer
stated:
Essentially the Court's approach [in Dono.'an v. Dewey) embraces two equally
necessary steps:
(\) a legislative determination as to the specific regulatory needs of an industry;
and
(2) statutory establishment of inspection procedures and definition of their frequency. viewed as the functional equivalent of individuaJiz.ed search warrants (or
as the Court put it, "a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant").
This is not of course to say that ad.'ance notice of the specific search is constitutionally required, for neither the Donol'an-approved procedure nor a search warrant
itself involves actual advance notice to the party searched of just when the search
will take place.
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general program of warrantless inspections, the Court had mentioned that "[t]he Act itself clearly notifies the operator that inspections will be performed on a regular basis,"138 and indeed, the
Court later stated that "it is the pervasiveness and regularity of the
federal regulation that ultimately determines whether a warrant is
necessary to render an inspection program reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment."139
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the standards applicable to mine operators are specifically set forth in the Act or in the
Code of Federal Regulations,140 thus establishing a predictable
518 F. Supp. at 586.
Similarly, Joe Flynn Rare Coins, Inc. v. Stephan, 526 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Kan.
1981), held that a statute that authorized law enforcement officers to make warrantless
inspections "at any time" of the business premises of pawnbrokers and preciolls metal
dealers "to search for and to take into possession any article known or believed. . .
to have been stolen," could not be upheld under the pervasively regulated industry
exception, because, in part, "the regulatory presence is not sufficiently defined that the
owner is aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for
specific purposes. The owner has no knowledge of the law enforcement officer's investigations or hunches that might lead him to believe an item is stolen. . . . The
searches could be as frequent as every day or as sparse as once a year." 526 F. Supp.
at 1285.
q: NRC v. Radiation Technology, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1266 (D. N.J. 1981) which
upheld as constitutional, under Donovan v. Dewey, warrantless administrative inspections of by-product material licensees under the Atomic Energy Act, which authorizes
the NRC to provide by regulation for such inspections of a licensee's activities as are
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(0) (1976), and under
NRC regulations promulgated under the Act, which provide for inspection of such
licensees "at all reasonable times," 10 C.F.R. § 30.52(a). This holding in Radlallon
Technology is inconsistent with the holdings in Donovan v. Dewey and Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., which stress that statutes must require periodic warrantless inspections
at specified intervals of all businesses regulated by a statute in order to fit within the
pervasively regulated industry exception, and that statutes which authorize warrantless administrative inspections at any reasonable time violate the fourth amendment.
138. 452 U.S. at 605.
139. Id. at 606.
140. Id. at 604. The Court then stated: "Indeed, the Act requires that the Secretary inform mine operators of all standards proposed pursuant to the Act." Id. This
statement should be interpreted as meaning that disclosure of proposed or promulgated regulatory standards to businesses subject to these standards is merely a relevant factor in determining whether warrantless administrative inspections under a
statute violate the fourth amendment, not a prerequisite to compliance with the pervasively regulated industry exception. This conclusion is based upon the general
principle that ignorance of the law is not a defense to criminal charges, unless the lack
of knowledge of the relevant law negates the scienter element of the criminal offense.
See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
(Ignorance of the law, however, may be a defense to a criminal charge punishing a
malaprohibilum act of omission. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).) If
ignorance of the law is not a defense to criminal charges, ignorance of the law certainly would be neither a defense to a civil suit seeking a civil penalty nor a factor that
would cause a court to decline to issue injunctive relief.
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and guided federal regulatory presence. 141
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 satisfies the periodic inspection requirement, because it requires that
inspections "shall ... occur on an irregular basis averaging not
less than one partial inspection per month and one complete inspection per calendar quarter" for each permitted mine. 142 The
Act also meets the specific-procedures requirement by directing
the Secretary of Interior to promulgate regulations establishing
procedures to insure that adequate and complete inspections are
made. 143
On the other hand, a number of federal environmental protection statutes contain provisions authorizing warrantless administrative inspections of regulated commercial premises at any
"reasonable time." Such provisions are nearly identical to the
warrantless inspection provision in OSHA that the Supreme
Court held violated the fourth amendment in Marslzalll'. Bar/ow's,
Inc. Federal statutes containing provisions that are likely to violate the fourth amendment by authorizing warrantless administrative inspections of regulated commercial premises at any
"reasonable time" include the Clean Air Act,l44 the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act,14S the Safe Drinking Water Act, 146
the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act,147 the Toxic
Substances Control Act,148 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,149 the Superfund Act, ISO and the Endangered Species
ACt. ISI Regulations promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission under the Atomic Energy Act that authorize war141. 452 u.s. at 604. Two paragraphs later. Justice Marshall. in a paragraph that
concludes by stating that the general program of warrantless inspections under the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act does not violate the fourth amendment. similarly
stated:
Moreover. the Act and the regulations ISSued pursuant to It mform the operator of
what health and safety standards must be met in order to be in compltancc with the
statute. The discretion of government officials to determine what facilities to search
and what violations to search for is thus directly curtailed by the regulatory scheme.
/d at 605.
142. 30 U.S.c. § 1267(c) (Supp. V 1981).
143. 30 U.S.c. § 1267(h)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
144. See supra note 54.
145. See supra note 55.
146. See supra note 56.
147. See supra note 57.
148. See supra note 58.
149. See supra note 59.
150. See supra note 60.
151. See supra note 62.
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rantless inspections of by-product licensees (including nuclear
power plant licensees) "at all reasonable times"152 are also likely
to violate the fourth amendment,153 as does the provision of the
Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act of 1978 authorizing warrantless inspections of inactive uranium mill tailing sites "at any
time."154 These federal environmental protection statutes and
regulations, however, appear to comply with Donovan v. Dewey'S
requirement that a statute must specify the procedures and standards to be followed by administrative inspectors,155 except for
the Toxic Substances Control Act, which specifies only that inspections of chemical manufacturing and storage facilities must be
conducted " . . . within reasonable limits, and in a reasonable
manner." 156
5.

Privacy Concerns

In support of its holding that the warrantless administrative inspection provisions of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act do
not violate the fourth amendment, the Court in Donovan v. Dewey
also noted that the Act provides a specific mechanism for accommodating any special or unusual privacy concerns that a specific
mine operator might have, such as the desire to keep trade secrets
confidential, by prohibiting forcible entries by inspectors. 157 The
Act requires the Secretary of Labor to file a civil suit against a
mine operator who refuses entry, in order to obtain an injunction
against future denials of entry to federal inspectors. ISS The Court
stated that court proceedings in such a civil suit provide "an adequate forum for the mine owner to show that a specific search is
outside the federal regulatory authority, or to seek from the District Court an order accommodating any unusual privacy interests
that the mine owner might have . . . ."159 Donovan v. Dewey did
152. 10 C.F.R. § 30.52(a) (1982).
153. NRC v. Radiation Technology. Inc.• 519 F. Supp. 1266 (D.N.J. 1981), however, held that these regulations comply with the fourth amendment as interpreted by
f}onovan v. f}ewey.
154. See supra note 62.
ISS. See supra notes 54-57 and 59-62.
156. See supra note 58.
157. 452 U.S. at 604-05.
158. Id. at 604.
159. Id. at 605. The Court cited by way of example Marshall v. Stroudt's Ferry
Preparation Co., 602 F.2d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 1979), cerl. denied, 444 U.S. lOIS (1980).
which affirmed a district court judgment that included an order imposing upon inspectors acting under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 a confidentiality requirement to protect a preparation plant owner's trade secrets.

1982]

ENVIRONMENTAL INSPECTIONS

109

not indicate whether statutory protection of special privacy concerns of regulated businesses is a constitutionally required element of all statutes providing for warrantless administrative
inspections under the pervasively regulated industry exception, or
merely a relevant factor. Language in the opinion supports both
views: although the Court stated that "it is the pervasiveness and
regularity of the federal regulation that ultimately determines
whether a warrant is necessary to render an inspection program
reasonable under the fourth amendment,"I60 it also stated that the
reasonableness of a warrantless search depends on the specific
needs and privacy guarantees of the statute. 161 Even if accommodation of special privacy concerns is constitutionally required,
these concerns might be adequately protected by means other than
those applied in Donovan v. Dewey (prohibition of forcible entries
and requiring an injunction to obtain entry when consent is refused). Privacy concerns might be protected by prohibiting
agency use and public disclosure of items or information seized by
an inspector which the owner of the inspected premises claims are
trade secrets or are not seizable under the relevant statute, pending review by a court. The Clean Air Act,162 the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act,163 and the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act l64 may prohibit forcible entry without a warrant,
and if that is so, these three federal environmental protection statutes would satisfy a possible requirement of accommodating special privacy concerns. Neither these statutes nor the other federal
environmental protection statutes discussed in this article otherwise accommodate special privacy concerns, but such accommodation could be provided by administrative agency regulation or
judicial order, if required by the fourth amendment. 165
6.

Seizures

Another issue which the Supreme Court has not addressed is
whether the pervasively regulated industry exception authorizes
statutory provisions that permit inspectors, during the course of a
warrantless administrative inspection, to seize items that may be
evidence of statutory or regulatory violations. Several federal en160. 452 U.S. at 606.
161. See supra note 133.

162. Dow Chern. Co. v. United States. 536 F. Supp. 1355. 1362 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(dictum), which is discussed in note 54 supra.
163. Id
164. See supra note 57.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
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vironmental protection statutes, including the Clean Air Act,166
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,167 the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act,168 the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act,169 and the Superfund Act,170 authorize inspectors
conducting warrantless administrative inspections to seize samples
of pollutant emissions or discharges, wastes, or products, apparently without a warrant. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States 171 implies that warrantless seizures of items relevant to enforcement of statutory or regulatory standards are permitted
under the pervasively regulated industry exception. However,
Colonnade Catering Corp. held that the warrantless seizure of liquor bottles by federal inspectors, after a warrantless forcible entry into a storeroom, violated the fourth amendment. 172 The
Court stated in dictum that "Congress has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures," 113
thereby indicating that an authorized seizure would be permissible. Thus, the pervasively regulated industry exception may authorize the warrantless seizure of evidence such as wastewater
samples, ambient air samples, stack gas samples, and soil samples
obtained for purposes of testing pollutant concentrations. Certainly, seizure of evidence of statutory and regulatory violations
may be as necessary as visual inspections of commercial property
for proper enforcement of statutory and regulatory standards governing a pervasively regulated industry.l74 Furthermore, seizure
of pollutant samples would not infringe upon expectations of privacy to a significantly greater extent than would visual observations by an inspector. 175
If a warrantless seizure of an item of evidence or potential evi166. See supra note 54.
167. See supra note 55.
168. See supra note 57.
169. See supra note 59.
170. See supra note 60.
171. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
172. See supra note 77 and text accompanying notes 76-78.
173. 397 U.S. at 77 (emphasis supplied).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 109-19.
175. q: Joe Flynn Rare Coins, Inc. v. Stephan, 526 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Kan. 1981),
which held that a statute that authorized law enforcement officers to make warrantless
inspections of the business premises of pawnbrokers and precious metal dealers, and
"to search for and to take into possession any article known or believed to have been
stolen," violated the fourth amendment because it gave law enforcement officers "virtually unlimited discretion" as to what articles can be searched for or seized. 526 F.
Supp. at 1286. The court also held that, because the statute authorized seizure of an
article upon "mere belief' that it was stolen, the statute violated the fourth amend-
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dence, such as a sample of a pollutant emission or discharge. is
not authorized by a federal environmental protection statute or is
not a permissible act by an inspector under the pervasively regulated industry exception, an inspector may not seize items encountered during a warrantless inspection of commercial premises
unless the requirements of the "plain view" seizure doctrine are
met. 176
7.

Penalties

Federal environmental protection statutes provide that an owner of commercial premises who refuses entry to an administrative
inspector seeking to make a lawful administrative inspection is
subject to criminal penalties. civil penalties. injunctive relief. or a
ment requirement that there must be probable cause or reasonable beltef that an arucle is stolen in order to seize the article. I d
Warrantless seizures of business records or industrial equipment. the loss of which
would significantly disrupt business operations. should not be penrutted under the
pervasively regulated industry exception. because such seizures would be unreasonable under the fourth amendment unless authorized by a warrant. Cf Hale v. HenkeL.
20l U.S. 43 (1906) (grand jury subpoena duces tecum requiring production of corporate documents will be quashed where it might be difficult for business operations to
be carried on after requested documents have been turned over and where no necessity for examining all of requested documents has been shown).
176. A warrantless seizure of an item is permitted under the "plain view" seIZure
doctrine if three requirements are met. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire. 403 U.S.
443 (1971); Washington v. Chrisman. 455 U.S. I (1982). First. the government agent
making the seizure must have lawfully entered the premises where the seizure was
made. pursuant either to a warrant or to one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466. and must have discovered the seized item in a place
in which the agent is authorized to be under a warrant or under one of the exceptions
to the warrant requirement. Chrisman. 455 U.S. at I. Second. it must be immediately
apparent to the agent when he first discovers the items that there is probable cause
(reasonable grounds) to believe that the item is evidence. contraband. or an instrumentality of crime. Coolidge. 403 U.S. at 466-67. or another object that is seJZable
under the fourth amendment (see Warden v. Hayden. 387 U.S. 294 (1967». Without
any further testing or investigation of the item to determine if the item has a nexus to
criminal activity. See C. WHITEBREAD. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN AN.~L YSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS § 11.04 (1980). Finally. the discovery of the
item must be inadvertent. Coolidge. 403 U.S. at 469-71 (i.e.• prior to the seizure of the
item the government agent must not have had probable cause to believe the seIZed
item would be found on the premises. See supra C. WHITEBREAD. § 11.03). BUI the
warrantless seizure of contraband and stolen or dangerous objects may be permissible
under the "plain view" seizure doctrine even when the agent knows ID advance that
he will find the seized object in plain view on the premises and IDtends to seIZe the
object. See Coolidge. 403 U.S. at 471. 472. Pollutants that might threaten public
health or the environment arguably are "dangerous objects" WlthlD the mcanmg of
this exception to the "inadvertent discovery" requirement of the "plaID view" seIZure
doctrine.
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combination of two or more such remedies. J77
177. The Clean Water Act provides that a person who violates the provisions of33
U.S.C. § 1318 (1976) with respect to entry, inspection, and sampling by EPA may be
subject to injunctive relief, civil penalties, and criminal penalties of fines and imprisonment. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c), (d) (1976). Similarly, the Toxic Substances Control Act
provides that a person who fails or refuses to permit an entry or inspection authorized
by 15 U.S.C. § 2610 (1976) can be subject to civil penalties and criminal penalties of
fines and imprisonment. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2614, 2615 (1976). The Act does not explicitly
authorize injunctive relief against a person denying an entry or inspection authorized
by 15 U.S.C. § 2610, although the Act gives federal district courts jurisdiction in civil
actions to "compel the taking of any action required by or under" the Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2616(a)(C) (1976). This latter section might authorize issuance of an injunction ordering a person to permit an entry and inspection authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 2610.
Under the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, a person who refuses to allow the inspection of any records or establishment pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 136f, g
(Supp. 1982), or refuses to allow an officer or employee of EPA to take a sample of
any pesticide pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 136g (Supp. 1982), may be subject to a civil
penalty or criminal penalties of fines and imprisonment. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136j(2)(B). 1361
(Supp. 1982). The Act, however, does not explicitly authorize injunctive relief against
a person who refuses to allow entry, inspection, or sampling that is authorized by the
Act, although federal district courts are given jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 136(c) (Supp. 1982). This section would appear to authorize federal district courts to enjoin a person from preventing entry, inspection, or
sampling that is authorized under the Act. If a person violates a provision of a permit
issued under the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act providing for warrantless inspections of vessels transporting materials that will be dumped in ocean
waters, he may be subject to civil penalties, criminal penalties of a fine or imprisonment, or equitable relief. 33 U.S.C. § 1415 (a), (b), & (d) (1976).
Other federal environmental protection statutes are not as comprehensive in the
remedies they provide against a person who has denied access to administrative inspectors seeking to inspect commercial premises. The Clean Air Act provides that a
person who fails or refuses to comply with any requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 7414
(Supp. V 1981) (which generally regulates inspections under the Act; see supra note
54) can be subject to permanent or temporary injunctive relief or a civil penalty. 42
U.S.C. § 7413(b)(4) (Supp. V 1981), but is not subject to criminal penalties. See 42
U.S.C. § 7413(c) (Supp. V 1981). In addition, the Clean Air Act provides that a person who fails or refuses to permit entry, testing, or inspection authorized under 42
U.S.C. § 7525(c) (Supp. V 1981) (which regulates manufacturers of automobiles and
automobile engines; see supra note 54) is subject to a civil penalty. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7522(a)(2), 7524 (Supp. V 1981). Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, a person who denies entry to inspectors seeking to make an authorized entry and inspection pursuant to the Act is subject to injunctive relief, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1271(c) (Supp. V 1981), and also is subject to a civil penalty if such action is a
"violation" ofa "provision" of the Act. 30 U.S.C. § 1268(a) (Supp. V 1981). Denial
of entry and inspection, however, is not a criminal offense under the Act. See 30
U.S.C. § 1268(e) (Supp. V 1981). A person who refuses entry, inspection. or sampling
that is authorized by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act may be subject to
a civil penalty if such conduct is considered to be a "violation of any requirement" of
the hazardous waste subchapter of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3) (1976). although
the Act does not provide for criminal penalties for such conduct, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(d) (Supp. V 1981), or injunctive relief for such conduct. Cj 42 U.S.C. § 6973
(Supp. V 1981). A person who refuses entry to an inspector seeking to make an inspection pursuant to NRC regulations. see supra note 66, is subject to revocation of
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Donovan v. Dewey did not address the appropriate penalties to
be imposed upon a person who denies entry to an inspector seeking to make a lawful administrative inspection, although earlier
Supreme Court decisions have done so. The Donovan majority
noted that a mine operator who denies entry to an inspector acting
pursuant to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act can be issued
a citation and assessed civil penalties pursuant to regulations l78
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to the Act. 179
But the Supreme Court did not discuss the constitutionality of imposing this civil penalty. Nor did the Court discuss the possibility
of a criminal fine or imprisonment in Donovan. United States v.
Biswell,180 however, held that the provisions of the Gun Control
Act of 1968 181 that made it a criminal offense to deny entry to
administrative inspectors were constitutional.
In summary, under the fourth amendment, federal environmental protection statutes are permitted to subject a person who refuses entry to an inspector seeking to make a lawful
administrative inspection to injunctive relief, civil penalties, or
criminal penalties.
WARRANTLESS INSPECTIONS UNDER THE
EMERGENCY EXCEPTION

The pervasively regulated industry exception is not the only exception to the general rule requiring a warrant to make a search or
seizure: 182 warrantless administrative inspections may also be
his license, 42 U.S.c. § 2236 (1976). to injunctive relief. id at § 2280. and to civil
penalties, id at § 2282, but not to criminal penalties. Id at §§ 2272-2277 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). A person who refuses entry to an inspector seeking to make an inspection authorized by the Endangered Species Act under 16 U.S.C. § 1538(d)(2)(B) is
subject to civil penalties, id at § 154O(a)(I) (Supp. 1982) and criminal penalties.ld at
§ 154O(b)(I) (Supp. 1982), but not to injunctive relief in a suit brought by the federal
government. Cf. id at § 154O(g) (1976). The Safe Drinking Water Act provides that
a person who fails or refuses to allow the EPA Administrator or his representatives to
enter premises and conduct an inspection that is authorized under the Act may be
fined not more than $5,000, 42 U.S.c. § 300j-4{c) (Supp. V 1981): the Act does not
specify whether this fine is a civil penalty or a criminal penalty. The Act does not
explicitly authorize injunctive relief against a person who refuses to allow entry or
inspection authorized by the Act. See 42 U.S.c. § 300j-4 (Supp. V 1981).
The Superfund Act does not explicitly provide any remedies or penalties when a
person denies entry to an inspector acting pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e) (Supp. V
1981).
178. 30 C.F.R. § 100.4 (1982).
179. 452 U.S. at 597 n.3.
180. 406 U.S. 3\1 (1972). See supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
181. 18 U.S.c. §§ 921-928 (1976).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
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permissible in emergency situations. This exception has potential
for application in the enforcement of federal environmental
statutes.
The courts have held that government agents may conduct
searches or seizures without a warrant in a variety of emergency
situations. I83 The actions that can be taken by government agents
without a warrant depend upon the nature of the emergency situation. In some cases, warrantless entry of premises and the warrantless seizure of items may be permitted under the fourth
amendment, while in others the fourth amendment may only allow government agents to prevent persons from entering premises
while other agents obtain a warrant authorizing entry of the premises and seizure of items therein. I84 One court has observed that
there may be a broader emergency exception to the general rule
requiring a warrant for a search or seizure in the case of administrative regulatory inspections than in the case of criminal investigations by law enforcement officers. 185
183. See generally 2 W. LA FAYE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT §§ 6.5-6.6 (1978) (discussing warrantless entries, searches, and
seizures). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (dictum),
citing North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908)
(seizure of unwholesome food); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. I I (1905) (compulsory smallpox vaccination); Compagnie Francaise v. Board of Health, 186 U.S.
380 (1902) (health quarantine); Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 610, 165 N.E. 498
(1929) (summary destruction of tubercular cattle).
184. See 2 W. LA FAYE, supra note 183, § 6.5(c).
185. United States v. Syncon Resins, Inc., 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1305 (D.NJ.
May 29, 1981).
This court indicated that a "more relaxed approach" may be taken under the emergency doctrine in the case of administrative regulatory inspections than in the case of
criminal investigations and that:
. . . a finding of exigent circumstances is less demanding in the case of an administrative, non-criminal investigation than in the case of a criminal investigation. The
reason for this is clear. In conducting a search pursuant to a criminal investigation,
the government expressly intends to invade another's privacy. In this way the
search is more likely to be effective. When a search is conducted in an emergency
situation pursuant to a non-criminal investigation, it is not as likely that the government agents desired to invade another's privacy in order to better effectuate the
search. Further, the primary intention is not to use the invasion of privacy against
those persons whose privacy is invaded.
Id. at 1308 nA. The court in Syncon Resins based this conclusion upon Michigan v.
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), which upheld the warrantless entry and search of a burning building by fire inspectors to determine the cause of the fire, both while the fire
was being extinguished and four hours after the fire was extinguished; and upon
United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978), which upheld the warrantless
inspection by the Coast Guard of a seemingly abandoned boat.
The Un;ted States Supreme Court has not held explicitly that there is a broader.
more relaxed, emergency exception to the general rule requiring a warrant for a
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This difference in the scope of the emergency exception in the
regulatory and criminal contexts presents problems in the case of
enforcement of federal environmental protection statutes, because
emissions and discharges of pollutants may be subject to both civil
and criminal penalties under some federal environmental protection statutes, such as the Clean Air Act l86 and the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. 187 Consequently, it may be difficult to determine when an inspection of commercial property in a pollution
or environmental emergency takes place in a criminal or noncriminal context. The fact that criminal charges are filed after entry of commercial property in an emergency situation should not
automatically lead to a conclusion that the initial warrantless entry was a criminal investigation. The entry may have been a routine action to prevent or mitigate harm to the environment or
public health,188 and the criminal charges may result because unanticipated evidence of a crime is discovered after entry.189
The fourth amendment permits warrantless conduct by government agents where there is probable cause to believe that evidence
of a crime is on particular premises and that the evidence will
disappear or be destroyed during the time it would take to get a
warrant. In such an emergency, government agents may enter the
premises and seize the evidence pursuant to a criminal investigation.190 Under this emergency exception to the general warrant
search or seizure in non-criminal administrative regulatory inspecuons than m crumnal investigations. The Supreme Court, however, did rely upon the difference between criminal investigations and administrative regulatory mspecuons m adopung a
less strict probable cause standard for issuance of warrants for admmtstrative regulatory inspections and in permitting area-wide warrants to be ISSued for such regulatory
inspections. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967). See supra lext
accompanying notes 31-33. This distinction between crimmal investigations and administrative regulatory inspections also may be relevant m defining when warrantless
administrative inspections are reasonable searches under the: fourth amendment.
186. 42 U.S.c. § 7413(b), (c) (Supp. V 1981).
187. 33 U.S.c. § 1319(c), (d) (1976 & SUpp. v 1981).
188. See, e.g., 33 U.S.c. § 1321(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Nauonal Contmgency
Plan for removal of discharged oil and hazardous substances and mimmizauon of
damage from such discharges).
189. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler. 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (eVidence of arson discovered by fire inspectors while fire was being extingUished); Unlled States \'. Syncon
Resins, Inc., 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1305 (non-crimmal invesugauon of oil spills
led to criminal charges of unlawful discharge: of pollutants).
190. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (warrantless taking of
blood sample, from person lawfully arrested for driVing while under the: Influence of
intoxicating liquor, to determme blood alcohol content. held not 10 Violate the: fourth
amendment, because alcohol would dissipate from blood dunng the ume II would
take to get a search warrant). See also 2 W. LA FAVE. supra no Ie 183. § 6.5. Some:
courts require governmental agents to obtain a warrant in order to enter premtses and
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requirement, government agents may lawfully seize samples of
pollutants when the agents have probable cause (reasonable
grounds) to believe that the samples are evidence of criminal violations of federal environmental protection statutes and when the
pollutants to be seized would disperse or flow to other, unknown
locations, or mix with pollutants from other sources, during the
time required to obtain a warrant.
There also may be emergency situations involving threats of
harm to public health or safety or to the environment, in which
entry and inspection of commercial premises and seizures of evidence by administrative officials may be conducted without a warrant. 191 In United States v. Syncon Resins, Inc., 192 Coast Guard
officers without a warrant entered commercial property and seized
four wastewater samples after other Coast Guard officers had observed, from adjacent property, oil running into a river from the
property. The court found no fourth amendment violation, noting
that Congress had adopted a policy prohibiting the discharge of
oil into waters of the United States,193 and that the Coast Guard
had a statutory duty to prevent and abate oil pollution. 194 The
court found that if cleanup of the oil had been delayed, there
would have been continued discharge of oil and more severe, and
possibly irreversible, damage to the environment and to public
health and safety.19S The court held that this situation was an
emergency justifying prompt investigation without a warrant, and
that the seizure of the wastewater "was obviously necessary" to
that investigation. 196 Alternatively, the court held that the wastewater could be properly seized because it was in plain view once
the officers had properly entered the commercial property.197 Beseize evidence when disappearance or destruction of the evidence can be prevented by
guarding the premises and preventing persons from entering the premises. ld.
§ 6.5(c).
191. Cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (warrantless entry and inspection
of burning premises by fire inspectors to determine cause of fire held not to violate
fourth amendment).
192. 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1305.
193. 33 U.S.c. § 1321(a)(8), (c)(I) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), cited at 16 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) at 1307.
194. Id.
195. 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1307-08.
196. Id. at 1307 (citation omitted).
197. Id. The court was apparently applying the "plain view" seizure doctrine. See
supra note 176. The court in Syncon Resins did not discuss the "inadvertent discovery" requirement of the "plain view" seizure doctrine; however, even if seizure of oil
in the wastewater samples was anticipated and not inadvertent, the oil in the wastewater samples might be held to be a "dangerous" object and thus seizable under the
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cause the entry of the commercial property and the seizure of the
wastewater samples were found to be part of a non-criminal investigation,198 the agents' actions were held to be permissible under
the emergency exception to the general warrant requirement. The
court stated in dictum, however, that "the search and seizure here
actually fits more neatly within the exigent circumstances excep"199
tion narrowly drawn in investigating criminal matters .
CONCLUSION

Businesses, and in particular individual industries, may be
made subject to warrantless administrative inspections under federal environmental protection standards pursuant to the pervasively regulated industry exception to the general fourth
amendment warrant requirement. This exception is based on the
fact that violations of pollution control and environmental protection standards can easily be concealed by disconnecting or bypassing pollution control equipment or by discharging, emitting, or
dumping unlawful amounts of pollutants. Warrantless inspections are therefore necessary to deter violations of such standards. 2°O But only businesses within a single industrial category
can be made subject to warrantless inspections under this exception. Statutes that provide for warrantless inspection of all types
of businesses that emit pollutants into the ambient air,201 discharge pollutants into waterways,202 or generate hazardous
wastes203 do not satisfy the exception and therefore cannot be up"plain view" seizure doctrine without compliance with the "inadvertent discovery"
requirement. See supra note 176. Alternatively, inadvertent discovery may not be
required when there are exigent circumstances. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 470-71 (1971).
198. 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1307-08. The court did not provide any supporting anlaysis for this conclusion, although earlier in the opinion the court had stated
that the purpose of the warrantless entry by the Coast Guard was to investigate the
source of the pollution and bring about its immediate abatemenL Id at 1307. Although Syncon Resins was a case involving criminal charges for the unlawful discharge of pollutants, this does not mean that the warrantless entry and inspection of
the commercial property by the Coast Guard was pursuant to a criminal investigation. See supra text accompanying note 33.
199. 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1307. The court did not provide supporting
analysis for the conclusion, although the court may have been referring to the emergency destruction or disappearance of evidence doctrine. See supra text accompanying note 190.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 109-19.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
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held under the fourth amendment. The federal environmental
protection statutes, other than the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act,204 fail in various respects to satisfy the criteria
of the pervasively regulated industry exception, but these statutory
shortcomings can be cured by promulgation of appropriate administrative regulations. Even if appropriate regulations are not
adopted and no warrant is obtained, administrative agencies may
enter and inspect commercial property and take pollutant samples
without a warrant in emergency situations. The reasonableness
standard of the fourth amendment, now almost 200 years old, provides sufficient flexibility to allow effective enforcement of recently enacted statutes which seek to prevent harm to public
health and the environment from modem industry's wastes.

204. See United States v. Ray, 652 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1981); Andrus v. P-Burg
Coal Co., 495 F. Supp. 82 (S.D. Ind. 1980),affdpercuriam, 644 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir.);
and In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 456 F. Supp. 1301 (D. D.C. 1978),
affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

